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Recent Cases
MANDAMUS AND DISCRETIONARY ACTS-A NOVEL APPROACH
State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell'
The city of Joplin, hoped to attract new business to the community by con-
structing a laundry and leasing it to Industrial Linens, Inc. of Columbia, Missouri.
The City proposed to finance the construction project by issuing and selling
revenue bonds. An application containing a description of the project was sub-
mitted by the City to the Missouri Division of Commerce and Industrial Develop-
ment, a unit of the Missouri Industrial Development Commission, whose prior
approval of such proposals is required by Missouri law.2 The Commission approved
the project. Thereafter certain laundry owners in Joplin petitioned as relators
for a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to revoke its approval of the
project on the ground that a "laundry" is not an "industrial plant." The Circuit
Court of Cole County issued the alternative writ but after a hearing dismissed
the cause for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and on
a general finding for the Commission.3
Upon appeal by the relators, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court and ordered it to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus. The respondents
were ordered "(1) to rescind their purported approval of the project submitted to
... [them] ... by the application of the City of Joplin ... and (2) to notify the said
City that they have no authority under the law to approve the said project."4 The
court made this decision after reviewing the laws permitting municipal construc-
tion and subsequent lease to private concerns. The Missouri Constitution and
statutes permit such construction only for "manufacturing and industrial develop-
ment,"5 and for "industrial plant[s]."S The court decided these phrases do not
comprehend laundries and that the Division had no authority to approve Joplin's
application.7 In the words of the court, "[t]he respondents have acted outside their
jurisdiction by presuming to construe the constitution and to extend its terms to
1. 426 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1968).
2. §§ 100.050-.060, RSMo 1967 Supp. The Division of Commerce and In-
dustrial Development is controlled by the Industrial Development Commission.
Respondents constituted the officers and directors of the Commission and the
director of the Division.
3. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d I1, 12 (Mo. 1968).
4. Id. at 19.
5. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 27.
6. § 100.010, RSMo 1967 Supp.
7. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 18 (Mo. 1968).
(408)
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this project; if they had a discretion at all, it has been abused, for their action has
been wrong 'as a matter of law'."8
It would appear doubtful that a "laundry" is not an "industrial plant"
purely "as a matter of law." If the court was ruling, as a matter of policy, that
"laundries" are not the types of commercial operations which ought to be subsi-
dized by municipally issued revenue bonds, it might well have done so by holding
that the Division had exceeded the authority granted to it under the statute. But
such a decision would raise the recurring and troublesome question of whether and
when a court should substitute its own judgment for that of an administrative
agency. Certainly an arbitrary agency decision should be struck down, but when a
decision is rendered in good faith and on a rational basis, it is at least arguable that
the court contravenes legislative intention by substituting its judgment. The basic
difficulty in most situations is the lack of any clear guidelines in the court's
choosing in one instance to overrule an agency, and, in another, to uphold its
decision. A good discussion is found in the Davis treatise at § 30.14 which speaks to
the approach of the United States Supreme Court:
The perplexing problem is what motivates the Court to review some
questions of application more broadly than others. The Court maintains
two lines of cases, and it has never attempted a systematic explanation of
what guides it in choosing between the two lines in deciding any particular
case. Since the choice is not guided by explicit theory, the determination
of the scope of review of any particular application depcnds upon judicial
discretion. The exercise of the reviewing court's discretion in choosing
between substitution of judgment and use of the rational basis test in
any particular case is influenced by many factors that usually remain
inarticulate, including the court's attitude toward the agency, the degree
of thoroughness and impartiality in the agency's performance, the extent
of the court's agreement or disagreement with the administrative determi-
nation, the court's interest in and its appraisal of the importance of the
subject matter, alternative demands upon time and attention of the judges
at the particular time, need or lack of need for judicial bolstering of
administrative policy, need for stability of particular law or policy com-
pared with need for continued fluidity, manner of presentation of cases
through briefs and oral arguments, and fortuities of writing opinions
explaining scope of review in particular cases. 9
Professor K. C. Davis' criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court would apply with
equal force to the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in the instant case.
The opinion does not acknowledge any ambiguity in the term "industrial plant"
nor does it admit, as a practical matter, that whether a given enterprise is so
characterized would involve the exercise of considerable discretion-which the
legislature presumably gave to the Industrial Development Commission. By trans-
forming the practical question of whether a given enterprise is an "industrial
plant" into a question of "construing the constitution" the court reaches a rather
questionable result: i.e., that the Commission exceeds its jurisdiction and,
correspondingly, abuses its discretion every time it approves a project of "industrial
8. Id. at 19.
9. 4 K. DAVIs, Ai mINIsTRATivE LAw TREATisE § 30.14 at 269 (1958).
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development." Every such approval is a declaration that the project comes within
the meaning of the constitution.
What the court probably meant was that the Commission had discretion, but
not to construe the constitution wrongly-or, at least not differently from the
court's construction. The Commission's "abuse" of discretion that was "wrong as
a matter of law"10 lay in its assumption that the Missouri Supreme Court would
rule that a "laundry" was an "industrial plant." But it is not conducive to clarity
in the law for the court to imply that such a bad guess by an agency is equivalent
to the agency's exceeding its jurisdiction. If the agency reaches a conclusion in good
faith which the court later decides, purely as a matter of policy, is wrong, would it
not be better for the court to declare that the conclusion is so obviously at war
with the policy of the statute as to be ultra vires of the statute, rather than to call
it an "abuse of discretion" or to cloud the issue with talk of "exceeding
jurisdiction?"
The McDonnell case also further confuses the law governing the scope of
mandamus in Missouri. It is often declared that mandamus does not lie to control
discretionary acts.1 This fundamental rule has been the "most prolific source of
controversy" in the use of the writ.12 The rule developed because of the nature of
mandamus to issue only where there is a legal right to the action existing before
the mandamus suit is brought. The courts have generally concluded that mandamus
only applies to ministerial duties "simple and definite and imposed by law under
facts admitted or proved."13 The condition precedent to the issuance of the writ
is a showing that a previously established legal right has been denied.'4 One
authority has taken this to exclude all discretionary acts from the purview of the
mandamus remedy because "if the agency has discretionary power, there is no
refusal to perform a clear legal duty and no violation of a clear legal right."15
The McDonnell court, however, found the Commission's action controllable
through an exception to the mandamus doctrine. The court cited six Missouri
cases to support the proposition that an abuse of discretion can serve as a basis
for mandamus relief.'6 However, the court's use of authority is not strong.17 In
only one of the cases, State ex rel. Kelleher v. Board of, President, and Directors of
10. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1968).
11. State ex rel. Hand v. Bilyeu, 346 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
12. Note, 20 ST. L. U. L. REv. 346, 354 (1935).
13. Mo. Bar C.L.E., Mo. APPELLATE PRACTICE, § 7.3 (1963).
14. Id. at § 7.14.
15. 2 F. CooPin, STATE ADMINiSTRATrvE LAW 655 (1965).
16. State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1966);
State ex rel. Richardson v. Baldry, 331 Mo. 1006, 56 S.W.2d 67 (1932); State ex rel.
Hagerman v. Drabelle, 191 S.W. 691 (Mo. 1916); State ex rel. Kelleher v. Board
of, President, and Directors of St. Louis Public School, 134 Mo. 296, 35 S.W. 617
(1896); State ex rel. Lovell v. Tinsley, 241 Mo. App. 690, 236 S.W.2d 24 (St. L. Ct.
pp. 1951); State ex rel. Schultz v. Fogerty, 195 S.W.2d 908 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946).
See State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1968).
17. In three of the cases, State ex rel. Hagerman v. Drabelle, State ex rel.
Schulz v. Fogerty, and State ex rel. Richardson v. Baldry, all supra note 16,
mandamus was refused. In State ex rel. Lovell v. Tinsley, supra note 16, the action
[Vol. 34
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St. Louis Public Schools,18 did the court issue mandamus when the action was
discretionary. The abuse of discretion in that case involved the appointment of
all Republican election officers to control elections to the school board. The court
there described the situation, saying that "one can hardly conceive of a stronger
case of partisan partiality or of absolute disregard of the rights of the public
.... 19 This led to the announcement that "if the discretionary power is exer-
cised with manifest injustice, the courts are not precluded from commanding its
due exercise."20
The extreme situation in the Kelleher case illustrates the nature of the "abuse"
exception to the general rule governing the granting of mandamus. For instance,
one writer described the condition necessary to issuance of a writ of mandamus
as "a gross and palpable violation of the discretion" confided to the agency. 21 Fur-
thermore, in one of the cases cited by the court in McDonnell it was said: "where
the law is clear and unambiguous and the facts are undisputed, mandamus will lie
where the officer sought to be mandamused has 'clearly manifested a determination
to disobey the law'. ' 22 Another Missouri case stated that "discretion can not be
arbitrarily exercised, that is, exercised in bad faith, capriciously, or by simple ipse
dixit."23 It is doubtful whether the facts in McDonnell would permit control by
mandamus within the limits of any of this language. 24
Moreover, considering the lack of authority in the area, the action of the
Commission in McDonnell was not in any sense arbitrary, capricious, or un-
reasonable. Missouri had never ruled on the question of whether laundries were in-
dustrial establishments. In fact, it appears that the only judicial consideration of the
matter was in several Pennsylvania cases which held that a laundry could be so
classified for tax purposes.25 In addition, the Commission received an opinion
from the Attorney General of Missouri concluding that the laundry proposed was,
in fact, an "industrial plant" within the meaning of the Missouri Constitution.20
It would seem that the Commission could hardly be said to have abused its dis-
compelled was purely ministerial, consisting of the recording and certifying of
events at a school district meeting. In State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409
S.W.2d 672, 678 (Mo. 1966), the court stated that the action was settled in the
law and that the official had "no discretion to do otherwise."
18. 134 Mo. 296, 35 S.W. 617 (1896).
19. Id. at 311, 35 S.W. at 621.
20. Id. at 305-306, 35 S.W. at 619.
21. Note, 20 ST. L. U. L. REv. 346, 355 (1935).
22. State ex rel. Hagerman v. Drabelle, 191 S.W. 691, 694 (Mo. En Banc 1916).
23. State ex rel. Shartel v. Humphreys, 338 Mo. 1091, 1098, 93 S.W.2d 924,
926 (1936) (italics supplied). It can be noted that this rule is very similar to the
New York standard which one authority found to be based on an "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or unreasonable" test. See Weintraub, Development of Scope of Review in
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 33 FOPDHAMA L. REv. 359, 370 (1965).
24. Missouri has also recognized the view that an admission that an official
acted in good faith would preclude the charge of abuse of discretion. See State
ex rel. Rainey v. Crowe, 382 S.W.2d 38, 44 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
25. United Laundries, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 359 Pa. 195, 58
A.2d 833 (1948); North Side Laundry Co. v. Allegheny County Board of Property
Assessment, 366 Pa. 636, 79 A.2d 419 (1951).
26. Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri 179, March 29, 1966.
1969]
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cretion by relying on this limited authority. In fact, the Commission's approval
seems to have been cradled in a bed of reason, considered judgment, and good
faith. Its only shortcoming lay in not anticipating that the supreme court would
reach a different conclusion. The significance of McDonnell then, seems to be that
now even "errors" of this discretionary type are "correctible" by mandamus.
Assuming the disposition achieved by the court in McDonnell was just, it
would seem advisable to consider other remedies that would yield the same result. 27
One such remedy might be quo warranto, an extraordinary legal writ which lies
to oust a public official from the exercise of certain functions which are "beyond
the scope of the powers conferred on him by law."28 The official can be ousted
from these functions without disturbing his other lawfully possessed powers.29
Consequently, if the court took the position that the abuse by the Commission was
a usurpation of the powers of the judiciary, it would seem that quo warranto relief
would be proper. The court could then order respondents to stop assuming the
functions of courts. The disadvantage of the writ, however, is that since a private
person may not seek it directly, but must make application to the Attorney General
or the prosecuting attorney for the writ, "the public official has an official discretion
which he must exercise in the best interest of the public to determine whether or
not to bring the proceeding . *..."30 This official discretion reduces the certainty
of relief and, consequently, the adequacy of quo warranto as a remedy.
Another extraordinary legal remedy is the writ of prohibition. This writ lies
to "prevent usurpation of judicial power."3 ' Thus, in order to issue it the court
would have to find that the Division assumed jurisdiction properly belonging to
the judiciary. This requirement is essential since the writ does not lie to control
discretionary acts.3 2 Prohibition is probably unavailable in McDonnell because the
writ is "preventative in scope"3 3 and may not issue to revoke action already com-
pleted.
Even with their legal remedies exhausted, the relators in McDonnell would still
not be remediless. They could maintain an action for an injunction, one of the re-
quirements of which is that there be no adequate remedy at law.3 4 As taxpayers,
the competing laundry owners arguably have a right to bring an action to enjoin
an expenditure of public funds on an illegal project. In order to prevail, the
27. Immediately excluded is review under the Administrative Procedure and
Review Act. Under § 536.100, RSMo 1959, "Any person ... who is aggrieved by a
final decision in a contested case . . ." is entitled to review. In McDonnell, there
was no "contested case" which under § 536.010, RSMo 1959, is "a proceeding
before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are
required by statute to be determined after hearing."
28. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy, 347 Mo. 484, 490-491, 148 S.W.2d
527, 530-531 (En Banc 1941).
29. Ibid.
30. Mo. Bar C.L.E., Mo. APPELLATE PRACTICE, § 9.9 (1963).
31. Mo. Bar C.L.E., Mo. APPELLATE PRACTICE, § 8.3 (1963).
32. Comment, 18 K.C. L. REv. 173, 184 (1949-1950).
33. State ex rel. Templeton v. Seehorn, 208 S.W.2d 789, 792 (K.C. Mo. App.
1947).
34. Mo. Bar C.L.E., Mo. APPELLATE PACTICa, § 11.4 (1963).
5
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owners would have to show that some public interest was in jeopardy, but would
not be required to show their own possible damages.O5
In any event, the court in McDonnell chose to expand the scope of mandamus.
Prior to this case the rule might have read: mandamus will not lie to control
discretionary acts unless the exercise of discretion is arbitrary, capricious, and un-
reasonable. McDonnell tacitly amends the rule to allow mandamus where the
official's act, albeit in good faith and grounded on a basis of substantial evidence,
employs a different interpretation of the law than would the court. Thus con-
strued, mandamus becomes nothing less than a broad "petition for review." Clearly.
this does violence to the doctrine of administrative finality and injects a great deal
of uncertainty into the validity of many administrative rulings. Agencies vested
with discretionary powers may well regard their decisions as more vulnerable than
before. It was, perhaps, a recognition of the possibility of just such confusion that
caused the Connecticut court to state that when a discretionary agency "acts in an
honest and fair exfrcise of its judgment, that it proceeds upon a conclusion errone-
ous as a matter of law will not justify a court in issuing a mandamus to compel
it to take different action." 36
That the Missouri Supreme Court was unwilling to restrict mandamus to its
classical role may not be, on balance, as disturbing as the foregoing discussion sug-
gests. Mandamus is a writ whose hallmark in this state is flexibility. Some years
ago a commentator observed that "it is within the province of the courts in each
case to decide whether an act sought to be enforced is or is not ministerial, and
the distinctions drawn are often arbitrary ones, recognized only in order to reach
a desired result."3 7 However, as has been frequently noted of late,38 "result
oriented" judicial decisions undermine confidence in the integrity and stability of
the law, and, in so doing, create an inhibiting uncertainty in the affairs of men
and business.
InvEN L. FlugnrOFr
35. Berghor v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 136-137, 260
S.W.2d 573, 581-682 (1953).
36. State ex rel. Heimov v. Thompson, 131 Conn. 8, 12, 37 A.2d 689, 692
(1944).
37. Note, 20 ST. L. U. L. REv. 346, 355 (1935).
38. E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
H.Rv. L. Rlv. 1 (1959).
1969]
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REMEDIAL POWERS OF THE NLRB-EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
NLRB v. Strong'
A multi-employer bargaining association, of which employer Strong was a
member, negotiated a collective bargaining contract with the Roofer's Union,2
effective August 15, 1963, establishing compensation levels for its employees for
the next four years. On August 20, 1963, Strong sought to withdraw from the
association and refused to sign the agreement. The Union filed unfair labor practice
charges with the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the Board).
The Board found that defendant's refusal to sign the written agreement was a
violation of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act3
(hereinafter called the Act). Strong was ordered to sign the contract, to cease and
desist such unfair labor practices, to post notices of the Board's order, and to pay
the fringe benefits that would have been paid had the contract been signed at the
proper time. 4 The court of appeals refused to enforce that part of the Board's
order calling for the payment of fringe benefits stating that such an order was
beyond the powers of the Board.5 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Board was empowered by section 10(c) of the Act to order the
payment of fringe benefits provided for in a contract which an employer had un-
lawfully refused to sign.6
The Board's authority to fashion remedies for unfair labor practices is found
in section 10(c) of the Act.7 This section empowers the Board "to take such affirma-
tive action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of this Act .. .8 Congress drafted this section of the
Act broadly to allow the Board to create orders particularly suited to the needs of
the individual case.9 It was felt that allowing the Board to apply the Act to the
various combinations of events that might arise10 would help to avoid a rigid scheme
1. 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
2. Roofers Local 36, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and
Waterproof Workers Association.
3. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.§ 158(a)(5) (1964), states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
4. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 358 (1969).
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at 362.
7. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953); NLRB v.
Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 363 (1951); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 194 (1941); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 258 (1939).
8. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1964).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1935).
10. Manley Transfer Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1968); United
Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 932 (1967); Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765, 770 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d
921, 928 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 298 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir.
1962).
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of remedies by maintaining administrative flexibility, within limits, so that the
dominant purpose" of the Act could be more fully accomplished.12 Congress
inserted the phrase "reinstatement with or without back pay" into the section
merely to illustrate a type of relief available for the frequently recurring unfair
labor practice of discriminatory discharge, and not to limit the type of relief
the Board could order.'3 Of course, every policy the Board develops while
balancing the conflicting interests of labor and management must have an express
or reasonably implied basis in the Act.14
Although the remedial powers of the Board are broad they are not without
limits because the Board must petition the courts for enforcement of its orders.15
The courts must accept factual findings of the Board if, considering the record
as a whole, they are supported by substantial evidence. 16 The task of the courts,
then, is to examine the order to insure that it effectuates the policies of the Act.17
To aid in this examination the courts have developed a set of standards which
every order must meet.' 8 The Act itself has declared its policy to be:
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.19
11. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1964), states:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter in order to promote the
full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the
legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees
in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce,
to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management
which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to
protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affect-
ing commerce.
12. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
13. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 12, at 191; NLRB v. Waumbec
Mills, 114 F.2d 226, 235 (1st Cir. 1940).
14. NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 1962).
15. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e) (1964).
16. Ibid.
17. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 304 U.S. 361, 362 (1951); NLRB v. Die Supply
Corp., 393 F.2d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 1968); Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942(1967); NLRB v. Marshall Field & Co., 129 F.2d 169, 172 (7th Cir. 1942).
18. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REv.
1039, 1040 (1968).
19. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1964).
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In effectuating this policy the Board must balance the actions and interests of
both employer and employee.20 Even though the courts will enforce an order
requiring a substantial cash outlay,2' the remedy must not be oppressive.22 The
Board must also effectuate congressional policies other than those in the Act2S3 and
avoid breaking other laws in the enforcement process. 24
Since the Board's powers are remedial every order must be in the nature of
a remedy and not a penalty. 25 The major task of the Board is to restore the injured
party to his original position 2 thus expunging the effects of the unfair labor prac-
tice,27 rather than to punish the offending party.28 The fact that a punitive order
is an adequate deterrent to future violations of the Act will not sustain it, for the
logical extension of such reasoning is to allow the Board to set up any system of
penalties it chooses so long as it successfully deters future violations of the Act.2 9
However, the Board can design an order to prevent the violator from benefitting
by his misdeed.30
The Board is a public regulatory body acting to enforce the policy of the
Act.3 ' Therefore, its orders must be framed to enhance the public interest, rather
than the interests of the private litigants. 32 Consequently, the function of the
Board is to act to prevent obstructions to interstate commerce by encouraging col-
lective bargaining and not to remedy private injuries.3 3 This idea is given added
impetus by the fact that no one can initiate enforcement of a Board order except
20. Kirby, Current Trends in Labor Law, 23 Bus. LAw. 1023, 1032 (1968).
21. NLRB v. American Mfg. Co. of Texas, 351 F.2d 74, 80 (5th Cir. 1965).
22. NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1965) ; NLRB v. General
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local 886, 264 F.2d 21, 23 (10th Cir. 1959).
23. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942); NLRB v. Williamson-
Dickie Mfg. Co., 130 F.2d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 1942); Texas Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d
186, 187 (9th Cir. 1941).
24. NLRB v. Scullin Steel Co., 161 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir. 1947).
25. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 362 (1951); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939); NLRB v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 227 F.2d 439, 441 (10th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Flotill Prods., 180 F.2d
441, 444 (9th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. American Creosoting Co., 139 F.2d 193, 196 (6th
Cir. 1943).
26. NLRB v. Die Supply Corp., 393 F.2d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 1968); Manley
Transfer Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1968); Local 57, Int'l Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967); NLRB v. Food Fair Stores Inc., 307 F.2d 3, 20 (3d
Cir. 1962).
27. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944); NLRB v. Link-Belt
Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 (1941); Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960, 964
(8th Cir. 1942).
28. NLRB v. Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Engrs, 385 F.2d 874, 875
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); NLRB v. Thompson Prods., 130
F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1942).
29. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940).
30. NLRB v. Coats & Clark Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1957).
31. Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Thompson
Prods., 130 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America,
128 F.2d 67, 80 (3d Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Killoren, 122 F.2d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1941).
32. Shank v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 444, 445 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1953).
33. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307 (1959); NLRB v. Hudson
Motor Car Co., 136 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1943).
[Vol. 34
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the Board itself3 4 and that Board remedies exist independent of any private reme-
dies the injured party might possess.3 5
Congress chose not to make the breach of a collective bargaining agreement
an unfair labor practice but, instead, left its enforcement to the courts.30 The
Board has authority over unfair labor practice charges and the courts over inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement.37 These spheres of authority,
although occasionally overlapping, exist independently and concurrently, neither
pre-empting the other.38 However, if faced with an unfair labor practice that is
also a breach of the contract the Board may apply the remedy necessary to cure
the unfair labor practice even though to do so requires an interpretation of the
contract.39
Finally, a number of so-called practical considerations aid the court in de-
ciding whether to enforce an order of the Board.40 Board remedies must not be
unduly speculative. 41 They should be appropriate in that they are equitable and
tailored to suit the facts of the particular case.42 The Board should also give a full
and clear rationalization of its decision. 43
The traditional remedy for an employer refusal to bargain has been a Board
order requiring him to bargain in good faith with the union. 44 This type of order
encourages collective bargaining and avoids Board determination of contract terms.
However, it also allows the employer, because of lengthy Board processes and
court review, to avoid bargaining collectively for a period of years, thus both
depriving the employees of economic benefits and undermining the strength
of the union.45 It has been noted that one employer's success in stalling the bar-
gaining process without financial loss encourages similar actions by other em-
ployers. 46 Realizing the shortcomings of the traditional remedy, the Board has
taken steps in certain areas to create more effective remedies. To forestall last
34. NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1942).
35. NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1941).
36. NLRB v. Hyde, 339 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1964); United Steelworkers
of America v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965).
37. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962); Colgate-Palmolive-
Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 363 (1949); NLRB v. Hyde, supra note 36.
38. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Carey v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra
note 37, at 198.
39. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., supra note 38; NLRB v. Local 745,
Teamsters, 228 F.2d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1956).
40. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REv.
1039, 1056 (1968).
41. Id. at 1045.
42. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953); Burinskas v.
NLRB, 357 F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 119 F.2d 326,
330 (5th Cir. 1941).
43. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442 (1965); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
44. George, Unfair Labor Practices and Their Remedies, I RUTGERS U. L.
REv. 56, 68-78 (1947).
45. Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-
To-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059, 1063-65 (1968).
46. Id. at 1065-67.
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minute employer delay the Board has ordered employers to put a completed
agreement in writing47 and sign it.48 When the unwritten agreement has already
expired the Board has given the union the option of having the contract begin
either as of the date of the Board ordered execution or the date of bargaining for
a new contract.49 The Board has also ordered that the expiration date of a col-
lective bargaining contract be extended to one year frona the date of the ordered
execution.5 0 When an employer repudiated a contract during the middle of its
term the Board ordered him to reinstate it, abide by it, and pay accrued overtime
and welfare benefits.51 The Board has also ordered employers to compensate em-
ployees for losses due to unilateral changes in contract terms,52 and has even
gone so far as to order reimbursement of money collected by an employer after a
unilateral increase in rental charges for employer owned housing.53 An employer
may also be ordered to bargain with a minority union if his tactics during the
period of the refusal to bargain caused the union to lose its majority support.54
In the Strong55 case the Board went a step beyond merely directing an em-
ployer to sign a valid agreement in that it ordered the payment of fringe benefits
which employees would have earned had the employer executed the agreement at
the proper time.56 The Board found its power to issue such an order in section 10(c)
of the Act, reasoning that payment of the fringe benefits would restore the status
quo of the injured employees and thus effectuate the policies of the Act.57 The
main argument against the order was that it thrust the Board into the realm of
interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.58 The Court
noted, however, that the Board has authority to remedy unfair labor practices59
and that such authority is not "affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise
.... 00o0 Since die Board can interpret and give effect to the terms of a collective
bargaining contract in order to remedy an unfair labor practice,61 and the refusal
47. H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); NLRB v. Highland Park
Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
48. Inland Lime & Stone Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1941).
49. Ogle Protection Serv., Inc., 149 NLR.B 545 (1964); Colony Furniture Co.,
144 NLRB 1582 (1963).
50. NLRB v. Huttig Sash and Door Co., 362 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1966); NLR.B
v. Warrensburg Board 9- Paper Corp., 340 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1965).
51. NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage Inc., 373 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1967).
52. Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 838 (1967); NLRB v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 324 F.2d 916 (7th Cir.
1963).
53. American Smelting and Refining Co., 167 NLRB No. 26 (Aug. 24, 1967).
54. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); NLRB v. Highland Park
Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
55. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 358.
58. Id. at 360.
59. Ibid.
60. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(a), 29 U.S.C.§ 160(a), (1964).
61. Cases cited note 39 supra.
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to sign was an unfair labor practice,62 the Board had the authority to issue the
order.63 Moreover, such an order is not punitive in nature. The punitive nature
of a remedy depends on the purpose for which it is imposed and the standard by
which it is measured.64 In Strong the remedy was applied to make the employee
whole, rather than to cause damage to the employer; and the amount of the award
was a reasonable reflection of the amount of employee loss. In the Strong case,
then, the Board has finally created a proper order that will not only do a better job
of compensating unfair labor practice victims but will also increase the deterrent
effect of the refusal to bargain remedy.65
The Board is currently considering four cases in which employees are seeking
reimbursement for the loss of any wages and fringe benefits the employees might
have obtained had there not been an employer refusal to bargain.66 In these cases
the remedy proposed goes a step further than the remedy approved in Strong
because in making such an award the Board must first ascertain what the benefits
would have been if a contract had been negotiated. Two trial examiners have
ruled that this type of remedy is authorized by the Act and two have ruled that it
is not.67 It has been argued that such a remedy would not be a Board dictation
of contract terms because it would actually remedy the denial of a "valuable op-
portunity to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement." 68 Regardless of the
validity of such an argument, the Board does have the power to interpret the
terms of a contract in order to remedy an unfair labor practice. It would seem
that the creation of the terms that are interpreted would be but a short step beyond
such a power. The major obstacle to the proposed remedy is that it would be too
conjectural.69 It has been noted, however, that difficulty in assessing damages
should not relieve a wrongdoer of his legal liability.70 Also, there are adequate data
available to the Board to determine the monetary value of the wage opportunity
lost by the employees as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain.71 Although
the remedy is much more difficult to defend than that applied in Strong, it is sub-
mitted that the Board will probably view the Strong decision as an indication that
62. Cases cited notes 47 and 48 supra.
63. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 361 (1969).
64. Schlossberg &c Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-
To-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. Rv. 1059, 1078 (1968).
65. In fiscal year 1958 1,039 refusal-to-bargain charges were filed, equaling
17.1% of all charges filed. By fiscal year 1967 the number had more than tripled
to 3,819 charges or 34% of all charges filed. McCulloch, Remedies for Violation of
Bargaining Obligation, 67 LAB. REL. REP. 183, 184 (1968).
66. Zinke's Foods, Inc., No. 30-CA-372 (NLRB Trial Examiner's Decision,
Dec. 18, 1967); Herman Wilson Lumber Co., No. 26-CA-2536 (NLR-B Trial
Examiner's Decision, June 4, 1967); Ex-Cell-O Corp., No. 25-CA-2877 (NLRB
Trial Examiner's Decision, Mar. 2, 1967); Rasco Olympia, Inc., No. 19-CA-3187
(NLRB Trial Examiner's Decision, Dec. 5, 1966).
67. McCulloch, Remedies for Violation of Bargaining Obligation, 67 LAB.
REL. REP. 183, 190 (1968).
68. Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-
To-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059, 1076 (1968).
69. Id. at 1069.
70. Ibid.
71. Id. at 1072.
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the Court will also approve reimbursement when the contract remains unnegotiated.
In the past Board remedies have often seemed stereotyped and stagnant. This
has been due, primarily, to a lack of creativity, a staggering workload, and a
judicial reluctance to enforce new types of orders.72 Whether one favors the Strong
remedy, the old remedy, or one of the many recently proposed remedies,7 3 it
must be recognized that the Board is attempting to create more effective redress
under the National Labor Relations Act. This recent application of a new,
imaginative, remedy is to be applauded as an indication of a strong and healthy
enforcement of the Act as well as a prophecy of more effective remedies to come.
MICHAEL B. MCKINNIS
THE LIABILITY OF ABSTRACTERS IN MISSOURI
Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co.1
Slate v. Boone County Abstract Co.2
The recent Missouri Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Boone County
Abstract Co. involved the following facts as alleged by the plaintiff: Grantor
restricted the use of land in 1956; Defendant prepared an abstract for Grantor
in January 1962, omitting the restrictions; in May 1962, Grantor conveyed the
parcel of land to Grantee-l; in November 1962, Grantee-1 conveyed the property
to Grantee-2; then in July 1963, Grantee-2 conveyed one half interest in the
property to Grantee-3, the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs acquired the land with an intent to develop it for commercial and
business activities, subject to zoning regulations. Subsequent to the purchase,
however, plaintiffs discovered that the property was subject to the restrictive
covenant placed upon it in 1956. This restriction prohibited the use of the land
for commercial purposes unless zoned for a shopping center.
Plaintiffs then filed suit in the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri,
alleging that the defendant abstract company had, by failing to include the duly
recorded restrictive covenant, negligently prepared the abstract of title for the
Grantor. They further alleged that defendant should have known or should have
foreseen that subsequent purchasers would see and rely on the abstract obtained by
the Grantor and that they had inspected and relied on the abstract shown to them
by Grantee-2 prior to purchasing the property. The plaintiffs asked for damages in
the amount of the decrease in value of the property because of its unexpected
limited use.
72. Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 70-71 (1963).
73. Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-
To-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. Rxv. 1059 (1968); Comments, 17 BUFFALo L. REv.
830 (1968); 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 69 (1963).
1. 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1967).
2. 432 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1968).
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Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on numerous
grounds, including lack of privity. The circuit court sustained the defendant's
motion. Plaintiffs appealed this order to the Supreme Court of Missouri, raising
only the privity question.
The supreme court affirmed the trial judge's order and ruled that a party not
in privity with the abstractor could not recover for the abstractor's negligence in
preparing the abstract. The court acknowledged minor breaches in the privity
defense in abstract cases in other jurisdicitons, but failed to find any situations
comparable to Anderson in which recovery had been allowed.3
The requirement of privity for standing to sue is traceable to Winterbottom v.
Wright,4 a nineteenth century English case which announced the rule that only
parties to a contract may sue for its negligent performance. The rule has not been
strictly applied, however, and many exceptions have been engrafted on the rule.5
Two of the main American attacks came in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.O and
Glanzer v. Shepard.7
Missouri has also adopted exceptions to the Winterbottom rule. One is the
MacPherson rule permitting recovery by the ultimate purchaser for bodily injury
caused by a negligently manufactured product that is inherently dangerous which
has been applied in appropriate situations.8 Recovery has also been allowed a
party who received and relied on a negligently transmitted telegram.9 No need for
3. Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123, 125-130. (Mo.
1967)'4. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). This case involved a situa-
tion where the defendant contracted to build and repair mail coaches for the
plaintiff's employer. During his employment, plaintiff was injured when a coach
collapsed. He then sued the defendant, alleging that the defendant's negligent
performance of the contract to repair caused plaintiff's injuries. The court refused
to allow recovery because the plaintiff was not a party to the contract and not in
privity with the defendant.
5. W. PRossm, ToRTs 658-664 (3d ed. 1964).
6. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The ultimate purchaser of an "in-
herently dangerous" automobile was allowed to recover from the manufacturer for
bodily injury caused by the collapse of the automobile. Liability was widened
because the term "inherently dangerous" was taken to include all articles dangerous
if negligently produced.
7. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). The defendant was employed by a
seller of beans to weigh beans and issue a certificate of weight to the buyer. The
certificate was delivered to the buyer by the defendant. The defendant negligently
performed his duty. The court found that the defendant owed the buyer a duty
of due care, "when the aim and end of the transaction" was to affect the buyer's
actions. Recovery was allowed in the absence of privity.
8. Lesser v. William Holliday Cord Associates, Inc., 349 F.2d 490, 492 (8th
Cir. 1965), contains a list of cases indicating application of the MacPherson rule in
Missouri. For a discussion of recent developments in the area of products liability
in Missouri see Krauskopf, Products Liability, Part I, 32 Mo. L. REv. 459 (1967),
and Part II, 33 Mo. L. REv. 24 (1968). See also R. Roberts, Implied Warranties-
The Privity Rule and Strict Liability-The Non-food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194
(1962); Overstreet, Some Aspects of Implied Warranties in the Supreme Court of
Missouri, 10 Mo. L. Rev. 147 (1945).
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privity has been found in either express10 or implied" warranty situations. A very
recent Missouri decision has even allowed an indemnitor on a surety bond to bring
suit against the architect in the absence of privity for the architect's negligent
certification of the amount of work completed on a building project.' 2
The Anderson decision, however, refuses to reject a narrow concept of privity
adopted in earlier Missouri abstracter cases.1 3 In Zweigardt v. Birdseye,14 decided
in 1894, it was held that privity did not exist in the absence of a contract of
employment between the plaintiff and tie defendant abstracter. The opinion
indicated that even knowledge on the part of the abstracter that a third person
would rely on the abstract did not create liability.' 5 Similarly, in Schade v. Gehner'6
in 1896, the court found an absence of privity when the abstracter had been em-
ployed by the plaintiff's husband rather than the plaintiff. The court held that
the abstracter owed no duty of due care to the plaintiff in preparing the abstract.'1
It appears that among the several states four exceptions to the rule that the
abstracter is liable only to the person who employs him have developed.' 8 Re-
covery has been allowed: (1) by statutes passed in various states requiring
abstracters to post bonds to provide relief for any person damaged by their
mistakes;10 (2) when the agent of an undisclosed principal employed the abstracter,
the agency relationship either establishing or satisfying the privity requirement; 20
10. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
11. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532
(St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
12. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967), the subject of a note by
R. Wieler, Torts-Negligent Performance of a Contract-Privity: Have the Excep-
tions Finally Swallowed the Rule? 33 Mo. L. REv. 531 (1968). Plaintiff was indemni-
tor to tie surety on contractor's performance bond. Defendant-architect who was
employed by ie owner of land to certify the amount of work completed so that
the contractor could be paid, negligently performed this duty and the contractor
was subsequently overpaid. After the contractor defaulted, the surety completed the
performance under its performance bond and was indemnified by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff then sued the defendant architect alleging that the defendant's negligence
caused ie default in the construction contract and plaintiff's subsequent damage.
The petition was dismissed but on appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court it was
reversed and remanded, holding the petition stated a cause of action even though
there was no privity.
13. Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. 1967).
14. 57 Mo. App. 462 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894).
15. Zweigardt v. Birdseye, supra note 14 at 467. But see Slate v. Boone County
Abstract Co., 432 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1968), overruling Zweigart.
16. 133 Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896).
17. Schade v. Gehner, supra note 16 at 259 and at 578. Schade also contained
important dictum regarding the statute of limitations. It indicated the statute
starts running at the time of the original negligence and not when the negligence
is discovered.
18. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 228-233,
29 P.2d 1065, 1068-1070 (1934). For a discussion of the exceptions see Roady,
Professional Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. REv. 783, 787-790 (1959).
19. See W. Eckhardt, Abstracter's Licensing Laws, 28 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1963),
for discussion and comparison of statutes enacted in various jurisdictions.
20. Young v. Lohr, 118 Iowa 624, 92 N.W. 684 (1902). Calling this an excep-
tion might be questionable. Under agency principles, the contract of the agent
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(3) where the abstract is reissued or recertified to the third party;21 (4) when the
abstract is prepared for the use and benefit of a third person and the abstracter
has knowledge of this fact.22 Missouri, however, at the time of Anderson had not
yet adopted any of the exceptions.23 In fact, the Missouri legislature has declined
to adopt an abstracter's licensing law on at least three occasions.2 4
Even though Missouri did not modify its privity requirement in Anderson,
it indicated a change could be imminent. The court, quoting Prosser, acknowledged
recovery has been extended to persons other than the individual who employs the
abstracter.2 These are generally persons who are identified to the abstracter and
who the abstracter would reasonably expect to rely on the abstract.2 6 Slate v.
Boone County Abstract Co.,27 decided fifteen months after Anderson, repre-
sents such a situation. In Slate, the seller requested the abstract company to prepare
and deliver an abstract to the purchaser. The trial court dismissed the purchaser's
petition because of the lack of privity between the purchaser and the abstract
company. On appeal the supreme court reversed, allowing the purchaser to sue the
abstract company as a third party beneficiary to the contract between the seller and
abstract company. The court placed emphasis on the fact that the abstract company
knew the identity of the purchaser and knew that he would rely on the abstract.
Anderson can be distinguished from Slate; in the former case the plaintiff was the
third subsequent purchaser and the court appears to have found that the abstracter
neither knew the identity of the plaintiff nor had any reason to suspect that the
plaintiff would see and rely on the defective abstract.
There is also other Missouri authority for a further relaxation of the privity
rule, Westerhold v. Carroll28 contains a test to determine whether a defendant
should be liable for the negligent performance of a contract in the absence of
privity. The test involves:
21. Beckovsky v. Burton Title & Abstract Co., 208 Mich. 224, 175 N.W. 235
(1919). Reissue apparently means to deliver the original abstract intact to subse-
quent purchasers for the regular fee of preparing the entire abstract.
22. Shine v. Nash Abstract & Investment Co., 121 Ala. 621, 117 So. 47 (1928);
Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899); Dickle v. Abstract Co., 89
Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890); Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 P. 166
(1912). The following cases indicate acceptance of the exception in appropriate
act situations: Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So.
195 (1940); Equitable Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co.,
188 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907); Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn.
320, 79 S.W. 799 (1904).
23. Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1967).
24. Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co., supra note 23 at 127-128. See
Eckhardt, Abstracters' Licensing Laws, 28 Mo. L. REv. 1, at footnotes 93, 94, 95,
96, 97, and 98 for a discussion of content and purposes of the various proposed
legislative acts.
25. Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123, 130 (Mo. 1967).
The court cites W. Prosser, Misrepresenattion and Third Persons, 19 VAD. L.
Ruv. 231 (1966).
26. See cases cited note 21 supra..
27. 432 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1968).
28. 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967). See text at note 11.
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the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct, and the policy
of preventing future harm.29
When these factors are applied to the situation where the abstracter is aware that
a third person may rely on an abstract he prepares, liability without privity would
appear reasonable. In most cases, the seller of property or borrower of money
requests an abstract of title for the benefit of a third person and abstracters know
the transaction is intended to affect third persons. If a mistake is made in the
abstract, it is easily foreseeable that the third person will be injured if he purchases
property or loans money on the basis of an inspection of the abstract. The require-
ment of moral blame on the abstracter may, as in Westerhold,3o be satisfied by
negligence. Also, holding an abstracter liable to a third person in this situation
would appear to encourage a more diligent search of the records by abstracters
which certainly would be good public policy and should help to eliminate future
errors.
Liability of abstracters without privity under certain circumstances, such as
the first purchaser example, is supported by the abstract itself. In contrast with
both title insurance and an attorney's opinion on the state of title to land where
the practice is to address the document to a named individual, in Missouri abstracts
are not addressed to any particular person but in effect "to whom it may concern."'1
This could be the basis of an argument that abstracters should expect entire chains
of subsequent purchasers to rely on their abstracts.
Other situations can be envisioned where an exception based on knowledge
and reliance by the third party would be applicable. Suppose the second grantee
in a chain of purchases asks for an extension of an abstract, originally issued to
the grantor, to cover only the period after the original was issued. The fact that
the second grantee did not have the original reissued would appear to indicate to
the abstracter that the second grantee is relying on the original abstract. Reliance
by the grantee would be even more obvious if the abstracter attaches the extension
to the original and delivers both to the grantee. The fact of possession of the
original abstract by the grantee would seem to indicate that he may rely on it.
29. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 81 (Mo. 1967). This test was
originally applied in the California case of Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650,
320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958), which involved a defendant who drew up a will for
the plaintiff's brother. Because of improper attestation the will failed. The
plaintiff received only a one-eighth intestate share because of the failure, rather
than the entire estate as the will provided. The court held that the defendant owed
a duty of due care to the plaintiff beneficiary under the will because defendant
knew the will was to benefit the plaintiff.
30. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 81 (Mo. 1967). The court indicates
that each element of the test is not absolutely necessary, and even though the
defendant was not guilty of any "moral blame," he was at least negligent.
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The extension of abstracters liability, however, raises problems. One is whether
current fee charging practices support such an extension of liability. Fees for title
insurance are based on the value of the property involved. In contrast, abstracters'
fees usually are not based on value, but rather on the number of years covered
or the numbers of pages involved in the abstract or in the current extension. This
would appear to indicate that current fees are based on limited liability and that
extension of liability would result in increased fees. Another problem would be
the amount of the abstracters libility. Will the abstracter be held liable for the
value of the property when the abstract was issued or for the value when the
subsequent purchaser is injured? These problems presently have no answer.
However, they may soon become more pressing if the reasoning in Westerhold
and the acknowledgement in Anderson and Slate that some modification in the
privity rule has occurred have indeed signaled a breakdown of the privity rule
in Missouri.
MICHAEL H. MAHER
"STOP AND FRISK": THE POLICEMAN'S FRIEND
Terry v. Ohio'
Sibron v. New York 2
The Supreme Court of the United States in Terry v. Ohio3 was confronted
with the following set of facts. While Officer McFadden was patrolling downtown
Cleveland, he observed two men as they repeatedly took turns looking into a store
window. After the two men, Terry and Chilton, had each looked into the same
store window approximately twelve times, they walked off together. A short
distance away Terry and Chilton rendezvoused with a third man, Katz, who had
briefly conversed with them while they were "casing" the store. Officer McFadden,
having followed Terry and Chilton, approached the three men, identified himself,
and proceeded to frisk all three for weapons when they failed to respond ade-
quately to his questions. As a result of the frisk, Officer McFadden discovered
weapons on Terry and Chilton. Both were charged with carrying a concealed
weapon and, after the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress the use of the two
weapons as evidence against them, they waived jury trial, pleaded not guilty, and
were subsequently convicted of the crime charged.
In a companion decision, Sibron v. New York4 (which was consolidated with
Peters v. New York5 for argument based on New York's stop and frisk law), the
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. 592 U.S. 40 (1968).
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
5. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), differs from Terry and Sibron in
that, although it reached the Supreme Court on a stop and frisk theory, the Court
decided the case on a search incidental to arrest theory.
1969]
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Supreme Court applied the Terry decision to the Sibron facts, which were as
follows. While patrolling his beat, Officer Martin observed Sibron for an extended
period during which time he saw Sibron conversing with known narcotics addicts.
As Sibron sat in a restaurant eating, Officer Martin approached him and told him
to come outside. Once outside, the officer said to Sibron, "You know what I am
after," whereupon Sibron "mumbled something and reached into his pocket."
Simultaneously, Officer Martin thrust his hand into the same pocket discovering
a quantity of heroin. Officer Martin arrested Sibron and after his motion to
suppress the use of the heroin as evidence against him was denied, Sibron pleaded
guilty to de charge of possession of narcotics.0
In handing down the Terry decision and then applying it in Sibron, the
Supreme Court has attempted to provide the police with a process they can use to
help insure that their searches and seizures will avoid the exclusionary rule of
Mapp v. Ohio.7 Before the Supreme Court's ruling on stop and frisk the police
officer was in a precarious situation. If he arrested a suspect at once, the arrest
might be held unlawful because it was made on mere suspicion. But if the officer
used force, threat of force, or used his authority to stop and question the suspect in
an attempt to obtain probable cause to arrest, this might be held to be an unlawful
seizure.8 The need for clarification in the area of stop and frisk was great
because of the diverse court decisions on the subject9
The fourth amendment consists of two clauses: the General Reasonableness
Clause, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;" and the
Warrant Clause, "[N]o warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be searched."' 0 The general reasonableness clause of the fourth
amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures, not all searches and
seizures." The basic proposition is that "[s]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment-subject to only a few specifically established and
well delineated exceptions."' 2 This is true even though police officers have probable
cause to believe that items subject to seizure are located at the place desired to be
searched.' 3 Probable cause alone is not enough to allow a search without a war-
6. 392 U.S. 40, 45-46 (1968).
7. 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. Note, 37 MICH L. Rv. 311, 312 (1938).
9. Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer To A Modern Problem, 58
J. CRim, L.C. & P.S. 532, 533 (1967); Remington, The Law Relating To "On The
Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police
Arrest Privileges In General, 51 J. CRAM. L.C. & P.S. 386, 387 (1960); Collings,
Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure-An Amicus Curiae Brief, 50 CALIF.
L. REv. 421, 435 (1962).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 847, 357 (1967).
13. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613 (1961); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
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rant, as it is to make an arrest. In order to make a legal search without a warrant
the officers must either have the consent of the person to be searched 14 or an
emergency situation (commonly referred to by the Supreme Court as "exigent
circumstances") must exist.15 There are three exigent circumstances which the
Supreme Court has recognized as supporting a search without a warrant because
they meet the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment: (1) search
incident to a valid arrest; 0 (2) the privilege to search an auto; 17 (3) the privilege
to search premises if the officers are in hot pursuit of a criminal.' 8
The Supreme Court in Terry, faced with the problem of allowing a "stop and
frisk" on less than probable cause and still classifying this activity as a lawful
search and seizure under the fourth amendment, had to make another exception to
the warrant requirement. The new exception is a "frisk incident to a valid stop,"
and it, like the other three exceptions to the warrant requirement, is based upon
the presence of exigent circumstances.19 Other courts and writers have distinguished
14. Stoner v. Calif., 376 U.S. 483, 488-489 (1964).
15. Warden v. Haden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
16. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
17. Cooper v. Calif., 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 366 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-177 (1949); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S, 132, 153, 156 (1925).
18. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
19. There are two elements that determine reasonableness of a search-initia-
tion and scope. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). The scope of each of these
searches, which are justified by exigent circumstances, must be strictly tied to and
justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 19.
A search incident to a valid arrest is justified on two bases-to protect the
arresting officer and to prevent destruction of evidence. Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). The scope of an incidental search in-
cludes power to search for fruits, instrumentalities, Preston v. United States, supra
at 367, and mere evidence of the crime, Warden v. Hayden, supra note 18, at 306-
307, 31G. If contraband is discovered, it may also be seized. Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
Searches incidental to arrest were traditionally limited to things and places
under the accused's immediate control. Carroll v. United States, supra at 158. But
more recent decisions have allowed a very thorough search of the premises ex-
tending beyond what would be legitimately deemed under the suspect's immediate
control. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
A search of a motor vehicle is permissible if two factors are present. First,
probable cause to believe that items subject to seizure are in the car. Second,
reasonable belief that the car will be moved before a warrant can be obtained.
Preston v. United States, supra at 368; Carroll v. United States, supra at 149. The
latter requirement is the exigent circumstance that justifies the search without a
warrant and thus dictates its scope. In this type of search the officers are allowed
to search the car and its occupants for weapons and the car for the items subject to
seizure, be they fruits of a crime, contraband, or mere evidence.
The third and final type of search previously recognized by the Supreme Court
as being justified without a warrant because of exigent circumstances is the search
made in hot pursuit. This warrantless search is justified by the dangerous situation
19691
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between a "stop and frisk" and a "search and seizure" by saying a "stop" is not a
seizure and a "frisk" is not a search.2 0 The Supreme Court in Terry expressly
rejected these distinctions2 ' and instead chose to keep a "stop and frisk" within
the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement by deciding that a "stop" is a
seizure and a "frisk" is a search.
In determining the requirements for a reasonable stop and frisk under the
fourth amendment, the Court emphasized the process of "balancing the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails." 22
In a series of cases before the Terry decision, the Supreme Court had determined
that the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment also required probable
cause.2 3 That is, to be reasonable, the initiation of a search or seizure must be
supported by probable cause.
The Court began its analysis of Terry by looking at the nature and extent
of the governmental interests involved in the initiation of a stop and frisk and
then weighing these interests against the right of the individual to privacy. The
interest of the government in initiating the seizure (stop) is its interest in crime
prevention and detection; 24 the interest of the government in initiating the search
(frisk) is the protection of the officer and innocent bystanders.25 After weigh-
ing these governmental interests against the individual's interest in privacy, the
Court said that since the stop involves less of a seizure than an arrest, and a frisk
involves less of an interference with the person than a full search, both a stop
and a frisk are reasonable under the fourth amendment if they are initiated with
"reasonable suspicion." 20 The stop may be initiated when there is reasonable
the pursuing officers find themselves in until they find the suspect and any weapons
he may have. The scope is deemed to extend to anywhere in the house the officers
could expect to find the suspect or his weapons. Warden v. Hayden, supra, at
298-300.
20. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1968).
21. Id. at 16.
22. Id. at 21, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 536-537
(1967).
23. Comment, 39 N.Y.L. R.Ev. 1093, 1095 (1964); Foote, The Fourth Amend-
ment: Obstacle Or Necessity In The Law of Arrest, 51 J. Cpam. L.C. & P.S. 402
(1960).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
25. Id. at 23.
26. The term "reasonable suspicion" is never actually used in the majority
opinion, but in considering the opposing theories on stop and frisk in Terry, the
Court recognizes that the Respondent urges:
[T]he police should be allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly
for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with criminal
activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should
have the power to "frisk" him for weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10
(1968) (emphasis added).
This language, coupled with the fact that the Court specifically rules out the need
for "probable cause" leads to the conclusion that when the Court speaks of
"reasonable grounds to believe" it is using the term "reasonable grounds" to refer
to the "reasonable suspicion" standard urged by Respondent. Id. at 392 U.S. 27.
Confirming this conclusion is Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sibron
where he stated, "Under the decision in Terry a right to stop may indeed be
premised on reasonable suspicion and does not require probable cause .... Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 71 (1968).
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suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot 27 and the frisk may be
initiated with reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect is armed and
presently dangerous, thus presenting a threat to the officer and passerby on the
street.28
The Court did not say exactly what reasonable suspicion is, but it did say
that the "officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts .... ." And in
evaluating the reasonableness of the search and seizure, courts must do so in light
of the particular circumstances using the objective standard of "would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" 29
The test the Court used to determine reasonableness of initiation of the stop
and frisk was: would a reasonably prudent man, possessing the officer's experi-
ence,30 have been warranted in believing that criminal activity was afoot, and that
the suspect was armed and dangerous, presenting a threat to the safety of the officer
and passerby?S1 It is not clear whether courts will be faced with a problem of
determining just how probable it was that a crime had been, was being, or was
about to be committed, or of determining whether possibility had risen to a re-
quired level of probability, 2 or if they will use some other yet to be devised con-
27. Authorities relied upon by Respondent urge that the standard to "stop"
should be "reasonable suspicion" to believe that a crime has been, is being or is
about to be committed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 n.3 (1968). The "criminal
activity may be afoot" test the Supreme Court expouses differs from the above
standard in that it, in keeping with the tenor of the rest of the opinion, emphasizes
urgency. Id. at 292 U.S. 30. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961)
defines "afoot" as activity which is "Under way: in progress." With this definition
in mind, it would seem that the Supreme Court did not intend for a police officer
to "stop" for a past crime unless it is proximate in time to the stop. It should
be pointed out that, although there is an inference that a stop is valid if the
"criminal activity is afoot" standard is met, the Court in this decision was addressing
itself to the problem of determining what constitutes a valid frisk and not to
establishing the standard for a valid stop.
28. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
29. Id. at 21-22.
30. Concern has been expressed about any standard which permits the officer's
experience to play a part in determining the reasonableness of the search. See
Oberman & Finkel, The Constituional Arguments Against "Stop and Frisk," 3
Cam L. BULL. 441, 445-446 (1967), citing People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 245, 219
N.E.2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 222 (1966), where the court asked, "What is
'perfectly normal' under a standard which incorporates the experienced police
officer's intuitive knowledge and appraisal of the appearances of criminal activity,"
and Bristow's Field Interrogation which points out that to a policeman, "anything
out of the ordinary is suspicious." Because of the element of danger in his work, the
policeman is generally a "suspicious person."
31. This is a composite of the Court's tests for initiating a stop and a frisk.
See notes 27 and 28 supra.
32. The court in People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 246, 219 N.E.2d 595, 600,
273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 224 (1966), claims the difference between "probable cause" and
"reasonable suspicion" is that "probable cause" involves the probability under the
circumstances while "reasonable suspicion" involves the possibility under the
circumstances; Stem, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer To A Modern Prob-
lem, 58 J. Calm. L.C. & P.S. 532, 536 (1967), uses exactly the same words in dis-
tinguishing "probable cause" from "reasonable suspicion."
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sideration.33 The duration of the stop was not mentioned specifically but from
the purpose of such a seizure, one can conclude that it necessarily must be short.
Other courts and writers have been concerned about the duration of the seizure
and have suggested that a time limit be placed upon the length of detention.34
The Terry Court then considered the scope of the search (frisk), the second
element in determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure.35 Great pains
were taken first in discussing how other courts have erred in not adequately con-
sidering scope of the seizure,3 6 and then in delimiting the scope of a frisk incident
to a valid stop.37 The exigencies which justify this type of search are the
necessity for "swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat . . ."38 and the self protection of the officer plus the safety of
innocent people on the street. In tying the scope of the search to the exigent cir-
cumstances which justify it, the Court concluded that the search must be "confined
in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or
other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." 39 The permissible
intrusion or scope the Court approved here was a limited patting down of the outer
clothing with a strict prohibition of placing the hands in the suspect's pockets or
under the outer surface of his garments until the officer had felt a hard object that
could possibly be a weapon. 40
33. Factors to be considered in determining if the officer had "reasonable
suspicion" to "stop and frisk" include the following: the Court in Terry looked
at Petitioner's suspicious conduct and the experience of the police officer; in
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 445, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34-35, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1955), the factors giving rise to "reasonable
suspicion" to stop were the incidence of crime in the neighborhood, lateness of the
hour, the peculiar approaches of defendant and the rapid leaving of defendant
when the police were observed; Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, De-
tention and Frisk, 3 CRIer. L. BULL. 597, 612 (1967), suggests that the
[factors to be considered ... include the suspect's demeanor, his gait and
manner, the officer's knowledge if any of his background, what he was
carrying ... whether his clothing revealed strange bulges, the time of the
day or night . . . whether any conversations were overheard, the streets
and areas in which the conduct was noted, whether any information had
been received from third persons ... whether the suspect was alone or in
the presence of others who were also suspect, and whether known criminal
conduct had taken place in the immediate vicinity.
34. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. RYv. 315, 321-322 (1942)
sets a two-hour limitation on the length of detention stating that "the two-hour
limitation prevents temporary detention from being transferred into imprisonment
ex communicado without the safeguards of arrest and its consequent responsi-
bilities;" A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 2.02(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1966) is even more conservative and only authorizes police officers to detain
persons for twenty minutes.
35. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968), where the Court said:
[I]n our view the sounder course is to recognize that the fourth amend-
ment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security,
and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the
exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.
36. Id. at 18 n. 15.
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 20.
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id. at 29-30.
[Vol. 34
23
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
1969] RECENT CASES
A careful reading of the Terry and Sibron opinions reveals five steps the
Supreme Court used, and which other courts may use, in determining if a full
search of an individual stopped on the street is legal. But before this five-step analy-
sis of a full search can be properly appreciated, one must be aware of another, inter-
related, four-step process the Court set out as being the procedure by which officers
can gain probable cause to arrest and conduct a full search from a stop and frisk.
For want of a better name this procedure will be called the "Investigatory Process,"
which will henceforth be referred to as the "I. Process." The four steps of the "I.
Process" are as follows: 41
1. Stop: Reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity may be afoot.
42
2. Frisk: Reasonable suspicion to believe that the accused is armed and
presently dangerous and thus constitutes a threat to the safety of the
officer and passerby on the street.43
3. Arrest: Probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being com-
mitted44 derived from the frisk incident to a valid stop.
4. Full search: Incident to arrest.
41. The "I. Process" is set out in the Terry opinion at page 10 where the
Court is discussing the alternative "stop and frisk theories urged upon it by the
parties.
42. See note 27 supra.
43. The standard test to frisk in both the Terry case, note 28 supra, and the
New York stop and frisk statute, N.Y. CODE C~ml'INAL PRocEDuRE § 180-a(2) (1967),
is that the officer must reasonably believe he is in danger because the suspect is
armed.
Section 3 of the UNIFoput ARET Acrr, Warner, supra note 34, prescribes a
slightly different standard: "[W]henever he (the officer) has reasonable grounds to
believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon." (Em-
phasis added.) Warner explains section three by reasoning that
[t]o limit "frisking" to persons he [the officer] reasonably believes are
carrying concealed weapons is to risk his life needlessly. Therefore, the
officer should "frisk" every person he questions when . . . he reasonably
believes that he is in danger if such person possesses a dangerous weapon.
Using this standard, the officer does not have to reasonably believe that the
suspect is actually armed, but it is enough if the officer believes he would be in
danger if the suspect were armed.
Taking into consideration the Court's emphasis on the justification and narrow
scope of a frisk, this standard prescribed by the Uniform Arrest Act may well be
so broad as to be unconstitutional. The Court emphasized that it did not consider
a frisk a petty indignity, and the sole justification for the search was the protection
of the officer and passersby. This being the case, it would seem that unless the
officer had "reasonable suspicion" to believe the suspect was actually armed, the
Court would consider the sanctity of the individual to take priority over the
neutralization of danger to the policeman. If the Court allowed the officer to
frisk, as Warner would, every time he reasonably believes that he is in danger if
the person possesses a dangerous weapon, one could ask, when is a policeman not
in danger if the suspect turns out to be armed? He is always in danger if the
suspect is armed and therefore, using the UNiFoam ARREsT Acr standard, he may
always frisk upon stopping.
Three states, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, have adopted the
UNIFORi AR.REsT Acr in toto.
44. 5 AM. JUR.2d Arrest § 30 (1962). "Except as statutes may provide other-
wise, a peace officer can arrest without a warrant for an offense not committed in
his presence only if the crime is at least technically a felony, by common law or
statute."
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By following the "I. Process" the officer can make a stop initially on reasonable
suspicion and then step-by-step work his way up to a valid full search of the
detained individual.4 5
The Supreme Court used the following five-step analysis in determining
whether a full search of an individual was valid.
1. Did the officer have "probable cause" to arrest?
A. If "probable cause"-inquiry ends because full search is permissible
if conducted in a reasonable manner.46
45. Evidently Justice Douglas, dissenting in Terry, either overlooked or
ignored the "I. Process" the majority set out. He took the position that the search
and seizure (stop and frisk) were illegal because there was no basis for concluding
that the officer had probable cause to believe that the crime arrested for (carrying
a concealed weapon) was being committed when he stopped and frisked the
suspects. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36 (1968). Justice Douglas contends that all
types of searches and seizures may be made only if they are supported by probable
cause. Id. at 392 U.S. 38. This being his basic premise, it would seem to have
been more accurate for him to criticize the majority opinion because probable
cause to arrest for the crime of armed robbery was lacking, as this is the suspected
crime the court bases the stop and frisk on and not the crime of carrying a
concealed weapon.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas does bring to the front a question
the courts will be faced with many times in the future-did the officers stop and frisk
because they had reasonable suspicion to believe a crime had been, was in the
process of being, or was about to be committed, or did they merely stop and
frisk a notorious character in the hope of finding a weapon on him? Although
reasonable suspicion is a lower standard of justification for a search than probable
cause, it still will not allow officers to stop a person and search him for a weapon
merely because of his reputation. The officers must have an articulable reason, see
note 29 supra, to believe the suspect is armed before they may stop him on
suspicion of carrying a concealed weapon, and a mere infamous reputation, without
more, cannot provide reasonable suspicion. Just as the Court would not allow
reasonable suspicion to be derived from the fact that Sibron conversed with indi-
viduals reputed to be narcotics addicts, it should not let a man's reputation alone
give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk for a weapon.
46. Justice Harlan, concurring in Sibron, expressed concern that there may be
a problem as to whether the arrest of the suspect occurred early enough, ie., before
a search took place. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 76-77 (1968).
The controversy as to what constitutes an arrest has been raging for years and
Terry is the latest case in which the Supreme Court has recognized that a mere
stop ping of a person or motor vehicle is not an arrest. In Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960), the Supreme Court established that police can detain
momentarily and interrogate without "probable cause" to arrest. And in Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 178 (1949) (Burton concurring) the proposition
that a stop of a motor vehicle is not necessarily an arrest was set forth; See also
Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 TEx. L. Rxv. 279, 280 (1945). This recognition by
the Court has not ended the controversy, but it has served to narrow the area of
controversy by eliminating from consideration the contention that any stopping
or detaining of a person is an arrest. Now the Court must face the problem of
deciding just where between an investigatory detention and a serious interference
with the suspect's freedom of movement a stop ends and an arrest begins.
The distinction between a stop and an arrest is essential in determining the
point at which probable cause is needed. Now, since the Court has legitimized the
p rocedure of stopping in Terry, a new problem could arise because of the possi-
bility, as Justice Harlan points out, of a full search being deemed to have preceded
the arrest and thus being illegal. This problem would arise where the court
determines that the officer's actions only rose to the level of a stop even though he
had probable cause to arrest.
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B. If no "probable cause"--go to step two.
2. Did the officer have "reasonable suspicion" to stop?47
A. If no "reasonable suspicion"-inquiry ends because stop is un-
reasonable and therefore, cannot support any type of search.
B. If "reasonable suspicion" present-go to step three.
3. Was the "I. Process" followed?
A. If "I. Process" not followed-inquiry ends because scope of search
was unreasonable.48
B. If "I. Process" followed-go to step four.
4. Did the officer have "reasonable suspicion" to frisk?49
A. If no "reasonable suspicion"-inquiry ends because frisk is unrea-
sonable and, therefore, cannot serve to give "probable cause" for
a full search.
B. If "reasonable suspicion"-go to step five.
5. Was "probable cause" to arrest obtained from the valid stop and
frisk?
A. If "probable cause" not obtained-full search is unreasonable.
B. If "probable cause" was obtained-full search is reasonable.
If courts in the future adhere to the above five-step analysis of a full search,
it may be advisable for police not to make an immediate full search of a person
whom they arrest on the street. The better procedure would be to frisk first only
for weapons, and then make a full search. By limiting the search initially to a
frisk, the officer has at least insured that the fruits of his frisk will be admissible
Justice Harlan contends, "[T]he prosecution must be able to date the arrest
as early as it chooses following the obtaining of probable cause." Id. 292 U.S. at 77.
This is, in effect, saying that once an officer obtains probable cause to arrest he is
deemed to have arrested if he proceeds to conduct a full search. This may be true
even though the officer has not formally placed the suspect under arrest, or indi-
cated in any manner, besides the seizure, that the suspect is under arrest. Many
times the only actual indication of arrest will be the change from a frisk to a full
search. Some courts have said, as did the court in United States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp.
138, 140 (W.D. Mo. 1939), that a search without consent is an arrest. If this is the
case, there is no problem because when the officer initiates the full search, he
simultaneously arrests, and thus the search is contemporaneous or subsequent to
the arrest.
47. The Court in Sibron indicates that if the "probable cause" test fails, the
search can still be saved from invalidity if the officer had reasonable grounds to
believe the suspect was armed and dangerous. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63
(1968).
48. If the officer, having only "reasonable suspicion" does not follow the "I.
Process," he will have dispensed with the frisk and will immediately have con-
ducted a full search based only upon "reasonable suspicion," a practice the Court
in Sibron specifically condemned. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968).
The scope of a search based on "reasonable suspicion" is a limited patting down
for weapons and nothing more.
49. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Terry pointed out that "[w]here such a
stop is reasonable ... the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the rea-
son for the stop is ...an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968). Also concurring in Sibron he stated, "If the nature of
the suspected offense creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety, I
would not permit him to frisk unless other circumstances did so." Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 1, 74 (1968). In the case of non-violent crimes, the officer would not
have "reasonable suspicion" to frisk unless the suspect made an unusual move that
could reasonably be interpreted as reaching for a weapon on his person.
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in evidence against the suspect even if the court determines that, although the officer
sincerely believed he had probable cause to arrest when he approached the
suspect,50 in reality he only had reasonable suspicion.S' Also, if the "I. Process" is
followed and the officer finds a weapon 52 or contraband during his frisk, this will
cure the deficiency in the justification to conduct a full search by supplying proba-
ble cause to arrest. Although the court may determine the officer originally did
50. There may be a problem if the officer originally believed he had
"probable cause" to arrest for a past crime. From the Court's language there is an
indication that reasonable grounds to believe the suspect has committed a crime
some time ago may not be sufficient to stop. See note 27 supra. If this is the case,
the frisk will be unreasonable if based upon a stop made without reasonable suspi-
cion to believe criminal activity was afoot.
51. Good faith alone is not enough to arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
(1968).
52. The Supreme Court in Terry concluded that since "Officer McFadden
confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the
men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons" without
conducting a "general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity
he might find," the scope of the search incident to the valid stop presented no
problem. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Upon the above language an argu-
ment could be made that a full search for contraband would not be upheld after
the officer had "probable cause" to arrest for carrying a concealed weapon.
In Terry, the incipient crime stopped for was robbery but the crime ultimately
arrested for was carrying a concealed weapon. The officer had probable cause to
believe the crime of carrying a concealed weapon was being committed in his
presence once he discovered the hard objects in defendants' clothing through the
frisk. When he discovered the weapon, he still did not have probable cause to
arrest for robbery; he had no evidence that a robbery had been or was being
committed. Since a search incidental to an arrest is justified by the need to protect
the arresting officer plus the need to prevent the suspect from destroying
evidence of the crime, see note 16 supra, and since the crime arrested for was
carrying a concealed weapon and not robbery, once the suspect had been patted
down and the weapon removed, Officer McFadden no longer had a valid reason
to search the suspect. With the weapon removed, and the officer's knowledge
obtained from the frisk that there were no more hard objects on the suspect that
could possibly be weapons, the officer was out of danger from hidden weapons.
And, since the crime arrested for was carrying a concealed weapon, the only
evidence that could be in danger of destruction was the weapon itself, and it was
in the possession of Officer McFadden.
It may be too fine a distinction to draw, but to partially avoid the above
limitation on a search conducted after a weapon has been found, the officer could
switch to a full search of the remainder of the suspect's person once he discovered
a weapon. The officer could not retrace his path over the person of the suspect
because this area had already been searched for weapons. What the officer could
do is change his method from a frisk to a full search over the yet unexplored
portion of the suspect's person. Using this procedure, the search would be valid
because once probable cause to arrest for carrying a concealed weapon is obtained,
an incidental search of all unexplored areas of the suspect's person can be made
for additional weapons. The officer would then have "probable cause" to search
for additional evidence of the crime and to further insure his safety by searching
for other hidden weapons.
In the situation where the police officer finds contraband instead of a weapon
upon investigating a hard object discovered during a frisk, he would have "proba-
ble cause" to arrest for possession of the contraband and could conduct a full
search of the supspect for further evidence of the crime. See, e.g., People v. Peters,
18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
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not have "probable cause" to conduct a full search, it could find that, after the frisk,
the situation changed and "probable cause" to arrest was present.
Applying the stop and frisk rationale to the Terry case, the Supreme Court
concluded that the stop and frisk of Terry was valid. First, Officer McFadden had
reasonable suspicion to believe that a robbery was about to be committed when
he stopped Terry and his companions. He had observed Terry and Chilton as
they looked into the same store window twenty-four times; he had seen Katz
approach the other two men, confer with them momentarily and then leave; and
he had followed Terry and Chilton and saw them rendezvous with the man they
had just briefly conversed with on the corner next to the target store. In light of
Officer McFadden's thirty years of experience in the detection of thievery from
stores in this same neighborhood, the Court concluded it would have been poor
police work for him to have failed to investigate this behavior. Second, the initia-
tion and scope of the search were valid. Officer McFadden was justified in believing
that the three men whom he suspected of contemplating an armed robbery were
armed and presented a danger to himself and passersby on the street. The scope
of the search was limited to that which was necessary for the discovery of weapons.
Officer McFadden at first only patted the three men down, never delving beneath
their outer garments until he felt a hard object that could have been a weapon.
The Court was satisfied that this search and seizure were reasonable under the
fourth amendment. Officer McFadden had stopped with reasonable suspicion,
frisked with reasonable suspicion, stayed within the permissible scope of a search
incidental to a stop, and arrested with probable cause obtained from his valid
frisk. (The extent of Officer McFadden's search after he obtained probable cause
to arrest was merely to remove the weapons from the suspects.)
The Sibron case presented the Court with an opportunity to rule on an im-
proper frisk. The Court found it unnecessary to determine if a seizure took place
when Officer Martin approached Sibron in the restaurant because this confrontation
was "immaterial, since Patrolman Martin obtained no new information in the
interval between his initiation of the encounter . . . and his physical seizure and
search of Sibron .. . .,53 There was an indication by the Court that, had the
encounter been crucial at this point, Officer Martin would not have had the
requisite reasonable suspicion to seize Sibron because "[t]he inference that persons
who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is
simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by
the police upon an individual's personal security."54 Therefore, Patrolman Martin's
conduct was unreasonable in the initiation and scope of his frisk. His testimony
revealed no facts from which he could have reasonably inferred that Sibron was
armed and dangerous. The Court held that the suspect's mere act of talking with
a number of known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period did not give rise
to reasonable fear of life or limb and Patrolman Martin did not himself "urge
that when Sibron put his hand in his pocket, he feared that he was going for a
53. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968).
54. rd. at 62.
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weapon and acted in self-defense."r5 Since immediately before Sibron's movements
Patrolman Martin had said, "You know what I am after,"56 the Court seemed to
take the position that when Sibron reached into his pocket he was merely attempt-
ing to comply with Martin's demand for narcotics. Had the officer said nothing at
the time of Sibron's actions, the Court might have interpreted the situation
differently.
Continuing with its analysis of Sibron, the Court assumed arguendo that
Officer Martin did have "reasonable suspicion" to search Sibron for weapons. If
this were the case, the scope of the search would have made the search illegal any-
way. "[A] limited parting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects
which might be used as instruments of assault" is the extent of a search for
weapons approved in Terry. "In this case, with no attempt at an initial limited
exploration for arms, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and
took from him envelopes of heroin."57
There will be fear in some quarters, and rightly so, that the legitimizing of
the "stop and frisk" technique will give the police a license to harass the residents
of low income, high crime rate, neighborhoods.58 The question is, will this stop and
frisk ruling prompt police to act in situations where they previously would not have
acted? And if so, where will this increased action take place? Whereas before
Terry the police were not sure when they could act or how they should act,5 9 they
now have a blueprint of sorts to guide them. With this blueprint, and the ability
to initiate police contact on the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, the police
are sure to act in situations where before they hesitated. When this is coupled
with the fact that the ghettos are where this increased police activity will take
place because of the high crime rate, the result is a situation where the Supreme
Court has interpreted the fourth amendment in such a manner that an imbalance
of police activity may take place in lower-class neighborhoods. Is this equal pro-
tection of the law?
As with any precedent-setting decision, these stop and frisk decisions create
new questions. Thus, clarifying opinions can be expected in such areas as the
55. Id. at 64.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 65.
58. For articles criticizing police methods in the stop and frisk area before the
Terry and Sibron decisions were handed down see: U.S. President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police
188 (1967); Police harassment, Foote, Safeguards In The Law of Arrest, 52 N.W. L.
REv. 16, 80-34 (1957), and Comment, Stop and Frisk: Dilemma For The Courts, 41
S. CALIF. L. REv. 161, 162 (1967); Use of "aggressive" or "preventive patrols" to
create an atmosphere of police omnipresence, Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio
on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRon. 87, 99-100 (1968); and La Fave, Improving Police Performance Through The
Exclusionary Rule - Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L.
Rrv. 391, 427-428 (1965); Note, 18 WxsmRs REs. L. REv. 1081, 1087 (1967); Reich,
Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966).
59. See notes 8 and 9 supra.
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admissibility of testimony elicited from a suspect during a stop,60 the suspect's
obligation to answer the officer's inquiries and the officer's alternatives in the
event of refusal to answer,61 duration of the stop, 62 permissibility of a full search
after finding a weapon as a result of a valid frisk, 3 use of an informant to obtain
reasonable suspicion to stop,64 and a decision as to whether an investigatory seizure,
60. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court estab-
lished the rule that a suspect must be advised of his constitutional rights before
an in-custody interrogation may take place. The Court went on to define custodial
interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." Id. at 384 U.S. 444. Then, to assure police officers that it
did not intend to hamper their traditional function of investigating crime, the
Court further stated that:
General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other
general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by
our holding .... In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent
in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present. Id. at
384 U.S. 477-478.
Most atuhorities agree that a stop falls outside of what the Court would classify
as an in-custody interrogation. Stem, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer To A
Modern Problem, 58 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 532, 540-541 (1967); Comment, Stop and
Frisk: Dilemma For The Courts, 41 S. CAI~F. L. REv. 161, 178-181 (1967). But there
is always a possibility that the Supreme Court could seize upon the phrase "or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, and use it to require the officer to advise the person
stopped of his constitutional rights before beginning questioning. Fisher, Miranda
Applied To Traffic Investigations, 16 TRAFFIC DiGEST AND REvimw 16 (Jan. 1968).
61. Mr. Justice White, concurring in Terry, states that "the person stopped
is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer
furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for
continued observation." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968). This view expressed by
Justice White is the generally accepted one. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and
The Law of Arrest, 54 J. Cpam. L.C. & P.S. 393, 417 (1963), would not compel the
suspect to answer but a failure to respond to the officer's questions would be a
basis for more pronounced detention; Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question,
Detention and Frisk, 3 Ciam. L. BULL. 597, 613 (1967), discourages "police from
using a suspect's alleged failure to identify himself as an excuse for carting him off
to the lock-up;" Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1205 (1952), states that "police have no right to act on the
theory . . . that mere lack of cooperaiton is a reasonable ground for arrest;"
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343 (1942), is in accord with
Justice White's view; A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ 2.02(2).
2.02(4) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), would allow the officer to use force short of
deadly force to stop and hold the suspect for twenty minutes for purposes of
questioning but would not permit the officer to compel answers.
Although there is a consensus of opinion that an officer cannot compel an
answer from a suspect whom he has stopped, the authorities do not propose
courses of action available to the officer if the suspect refuses to cooperate.
62. See note 34 supra.
63. See note 52 supra.
64. The Supreme Court in Terry held that where an officer "observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot. . ." he may stop and question. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The use of the term "observes" raises a question as to whether
the Court would permit "reasonable suspicion" to stop to be derived from an
informant's observations instead of the officer's own observations as the Court now
allows him to do in cases involving "probable cause" to arrest. McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967); Draper v. U.S., 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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upon less than probable cause for purposes of detention and interrogation or only
for interrogation, is reasonable under the fourth amendment. 65
With the rendering of the Terry and Sibron decisions, the Supreme Court
has heeded the cry for a clearly-defined policy on stop and frisk. Police can now
conduct on-the-street investigations with an awareness that if they adhere to the
"I. Process" the evidence they discover will be admissible at trial against the
accused. The overall result should be more effective law enforcement and less
frustration for police at the hands of the exclusionary rules of evidence.
JOHN C. MONICA
JOINDER AND INDISPENSABILITY:
NEW FEDERAL RULE 19 FIRMLY ESTABLISHED
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson'
The action in the noted case arose from a 1958 automobile-truck collision in
which one Donald Cionci was killed while driving an automobile owned by
Edward Dutcher. John Lynch, a passenger in the Cionci automobile, was also
killed. Dutcher, the owner, was not present at the accident.
A diversity action brought by Lynch's estate (represented by Provident
Tradesmens Bank &c Trust Company) against Cionci's estate (represented by
Patterson) was settled.2 Relying on this liquidated claim, Lynch's estate "brought
the present diversity action for a declaration that Cionci's use of the automobile
had been 'with permission of Dutcher' "3 naming Ciond's estate and Dutcher's
insurance company, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, as defendants. Be-
cause his residence would have destroyed the necessary diversity, Dutcher could
not be joined as defendant. At trial the district court directed a verdict in favor
of Lynch's estate.4 The court of appeals dismissed the case on two grounds, neither
of which had been raised by the appellants, holding (1) that Dutcher was an
indispensable party and the inability to join him without destroying diversity
65. In Terry, Chief Justice Warren specifically stated that the Court is not
considering this question. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
1. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
2. It was settled for $50,000, but Cionci's estate, being penniless, could not
satisfy the judgment.
3. 390 U.S. 102, 105 (1968).
4. In addition to these parties, the estate of Thomas Smith, driver of the
truck involved in the accident who was also killed, and Edward Harris, another
passenger in the Cionci automobile who was injured, were joined as plaintiffs. A
verdict was directed in favor of the Smith estate and a jury found for Harris.
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
218 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Penn. 1963).
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compelled dismissal, and (2) that the district court should have deferred considera-
tion of the suit to two pending state actions.5 This dismissal was reversed and
the decision of the district court was reinstated by the Supreme Court.
The essence of the reinstatement of the district court's decision is the
Supreme Court's rejection of the first ground for dismissal stated above. While
holding that the suit should not have been dismissed for failure to join an
indispensable party, the Court for the first time was able to establish its position
on the recently amended Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concern-
ing compulsory joinder of parties.6 The basic problem to which the Court addressed
itself was when must a suit in federal court be dismissed for inability to join a
party "needed for a just adjudication." 7 This problem is especially acute in federal
courts where often parties may not be joined because of the limitations as to
service of process and venue, or because of the requirements of diversity in cases
not involving a federal question.
The use of joinder originated in equity.8 The leading case, and perhaps the
foundation of modem joinder in the United States, is Shields v. Barrow,9 decided
in 1855. There the Supreme Court sought to designate standards to determine
those persons (called necessary) whose presence in the suit would be compelled if
they were available for joinder. In addition, the Court set forth the following
standard to distinguish those persons (called indispensable) who were so necessary
that failure to join them would compel dismissal of the suit:
Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy but an interest
of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affect-
ing that interest, or leaving that controversy in such a condition that a
final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience.' 0
Emphasizing the first part of the above test, many courts have developed
criteria in joinder situations which classify persons on the basis of the nature of
their interest in the pending suit. To solve the problem of dismissal where joinder
is impossible, the courts would have to look at the legal relationship between the
absent person and the parties present. If that legal relationship was such that either
precedent" or reasoning from precedent established the person as indispensable,
5. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966).
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
7. This terminology adopted in the new rule describes those persons whose
joinder should be made compulsory. Ibid.
8. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152 (1825). See Equity R. 37,
226 U.S. 659 (1912). For a detailed account of the origin of joinder up to its
enumeration in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855), see Hazard,
Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 CoLum. L.
REv. 1254 (1961).
9. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855).
10. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
11. A discussion of the precedent or recurring cases on joinder is necessarily
beyond the scope of this note. The interests dealt with by courts have fallen into
several distinct classifications. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions.
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then the suit in question would be dismissed.' 2 This emphasis upon the nature of
the absent person's interest in finding indispensability was found in the original
Rule 19 adopted in 1938.13 This emphasis, however, brought increasing criticism
from commentators.14 At ie same time some federal courts, including the Supreme
55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 356-374, 483-538 (1957), indicates, in addition to cases
arising out of diversity actions, there are the following two classifications: cases
involving contractual obligations jointly owed or owned and cases involving
interest in real property. See also Comment, Compusoy Joinder of Unwilling
Plaintiffs in Civil Actions, 25 Mo. L. REv. 63, 66-69 (1960), listing the following
categories: actions involving contracts, actions involving real or other property,
actions involving legal title, and actions involving a fund or estate.
12. An example is found in contract actions. If the absent person is one of
several joint obligors, his joinder would be compulsory. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS
§ 117 (1932); J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE § 19.11 (1948). However, he would be
only necessary and the suit could proceed in his absence. Murphy's Admrs. v. Bank
of Alabama, 5 Ala. 421 (1843), holding that the absence of an obligor from the
jurisdiction did not prevent the obligee(s) from suing the remaining obligors. On
the other hand, if the absent person were one of several joint obligees, he would
be indispensable, preventing further action in a suit where he could not be
joined. National City Bank v. Harbin Electric Joint-Stock Co., 28 F.2nd 468 (9th
Cir. 1928), and McAulay v. Moody, 185 F. 144 (D.C. Ore. 1911), both indicate
that absence from the jurisdiction does not justify omission of an obligee.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 187 F.2d 52, 59 (1951)-
(a) ... [P]ersons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined
.... (b) When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought to be
parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties,
have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the
court as to both service of process and venue and can be made parties
without depriving the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it, the
court shall order them summoned to appear in the action ....
14. Fed. R. Civil P. 19, Advisory Committee Notes (1966), in attacking judicial
joinder practice under the former rule, outlined the following criticisms to the em-
phasis placed upon the absent person's interest in determining indispensability: (1)
The original rule was intended to compel dismissal only where it would be unwise
to proceed, all factors having been considered. But the rule had been erroneously
expanded to cover other persons. United States v. Washington Inst. of Tech., 138 F.
2d 25, 26 (3d Cir. 1943). Cf. Chidester v. City of Newark, 162 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1947).
(2) Indispensability was plausibly equated with parties "having a joint interest." Yet,
it would sometimes be wise to proceed where one's interests are technically joint
or to dismiss where these interests are not technically joint. (3) The rule and its
interpretation emphasized the technical or abstract characteristics of rights instead
of more meaningful practical considerations. There existed no concrete factors for
the courts to apply in such a consideration. (4) There was some confusion arising
out of the fact that since joinder of a party determined indispensable would have
destroyed jurisdiction, the court was without the power to adjudicate between the
parties present. This reasoning, however, was a fallacious restriction of the courts'
power. See McArthur v. Rosenbaum Co. of Pittsburgh, 180 F.2d 617, 621 (3d. Cir.
1950); Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 113 F.2d 703, 707 (3d. Cir.
1940). Cf. Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 782 (1946). It should be noted that the bulk of the cases
cited by the Advisory Committee are from the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the circuit from which the Provident appeal was taken. This would seem
to indicate that the basis for much of the criticism was to be found in the line
of joinder cases in this circuit.
For additional comments and criticisms see Hazard, Indispensable Party: The
Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1254 (1961); Reed,
Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MicH. L. REv. 327, 333-34, 356
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Court, have based some of their decisions upon a more pragmatic consideration of
all the interests involved.15 The growing inconsistency in the standard applied in
dismissal situations, and other criticisms had a tremendous impact upon the com-
pletely revised Rule 19 adopted by the Supreme Court in 1966.16
The Supreme Court's opinion in Provident, and its rejection of the decision
and reasoning of the court of appeals, indicates the Court's intention to apply the
approach set forth in the new rule. The new rule explicitly and clearly sets forth
a practical balancing of the interests approach in which other interests are
weighed in relation to that of the absent person. These interests, including that
of the absent person, are: the interest of the party defending in avoiding double
liability, the interest of the party bringing the suit in obtaining adequate relief,
and the public interest in avoiding a multiplicity of litigation. After a court has
determined that a party is needed but cannot be joined,' 7 it must weigh these
interests according to guidelines set forth in the rule'8 and decide whether to
dismiss.' 9
(1957); Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Pro-
cedure, 31 TENN. L. REv. 417, 434-435 (1964). For an opposing view upholding
the approach to joinder under the old rule see Fink, Indispensable Parties and the
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YA.x L. J. 403 (1965).
15. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 54 (1955), stating, "Our former cases
have established a policy under which indispensability of parties is determined on
practical considerations;" Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1964); Kroese
v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 763 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 983 (1950); Roos v. Texas Co., 23 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1927).
16: See note 14 supra.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (a). Persons To be Joined If Feasible-
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made
a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the
joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of
the action improper, he shall be dismised from the action.
18. Id. 19(b). Determination By Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible-
If a person as described in subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot be
made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parites before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensa-
ble. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent
a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him
or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective pro-
visions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered
in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff
will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder.
19. The rule makers have eliminated the use of the term necessary. The
term indispensable is used only as a descriptive term after the weighing process
34
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The Supreme Court was challenged with an argument from the court of
appeals which, in effect, would have negated the use of new Rule 19 where the
question was that of indispensability. 20 The court of appeals contended that
whether a party was indispensable involved a determination of substantive law
existing outside of any procedural rule.2' In other words, there exists a substantive
right to be joined in any person whose interest was such as to make him indis-
pensable.22 The implication of this line of reasoning would have prevented the
courts from dealing procedurally with the problem of dismissal in compulsory
joinder situations. The Enabling Act23 prevents the Supreme Court, as rule
maker, from abridging any existing substantive right. Any procedural formula
that altered the present classification of the absent person's interest or weight
given that interest would be void as an abridgement of the existing right of indis-
pensability. Since, by implication, the new rule did just that, it would be without
effect under the argument from the court of appeals.
The Court met this argument on several grounds. It attacked the lower
court's use of three early cases which it felt provided the basis for the court of
appeals' finding of a substantive right of joinder.24 What was involved, the
Supreme Court contended, was not a substantive right to be joined vested in the
absent person but only a "substantive involvement."25 The absent person does
have certain legal relationships to the parties present in the suit arising from
their course of conduct. If, however, the absent person is not joined in the suit, he
may in no way be legally bound by the judgment nor may these relationships (or
substantive rights) be legally affected. The protection afforded these relationships
is not to be equated with a substantive right to be joined. Granted, the absent
has compelled dismissal. This seems to be a reversal of the reasoning process under
the old approach where the absent person's interest was of primary importance.
20. This challenge is emphasized by the fact that the court of appeals was at
liberty to decide the case under the wording and rationale of the old rule. Although
their decision was handed down after acceptance of the new rule, the old rule
was in effect during the commencement of the suit in the district court and at
the time the appeal was taken. Instead of basing their decision on this old rule,
the court discussed neither rule and aimed their opinion to counteract the impli-
cations of the new rule. The opinion itself was based on objections raised sua
sponte.
21. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co. 36 F.2d 802, 80 (3d Cir. 1966).
22. In so holding, the court was quite consistent with existing precedent in
the Third Circuit. Chidester v. City of Newark, 162 F.2d 98, 600 (3d Cir. 1947),
stating that indispensable parties under old Rule 19 are those who were indis-
pensable prior to the adoption of that rule; United States v. Washington Inst. of
Tech., Inc., 138 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1943); Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. v. United Artists
Corp., 113 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1940).
23. RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR DisTiucT COURTS, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 which
states in part, "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general
rules ... the practice and procedure of the district court4 .... Such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ...."
24. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855); Northern Indiana R.R.
Co. v. Michigan Central R.R. Co., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 233 (1853); Mallow v.
Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193 (1827).
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person may be practically affected by the outcome of the suit, but this is different
from a substantive right of indispensability.2 6
The Supreme Court also found that the court of appeals, which said that all
persons whose interests "may be affected" are indispensable, erred in reading the
test enumerated in Shields.27 Rather, the test refers only to those interests which
are unavoidably affected. In addition to this narrowing of the class called indis-
pensable, the determination of such a class should be made by weighing the absent
person's interest more in terms of equity and good conscience, a part of the Shields
test which has been largely overlooked. Through this interpretation of Shields v.
Barrow, the Court states that the test as set forth in that case and found in suc-
ceeding joinder cases is consistent with the balancing test found in the new
Rule 19.28
Finally, the Court discredits the old approach and its logical extensions on
policy grounds. The old approach, as exemplified in the court of appeals' opinion
represents a rigid and mechanically applied doctrine leading to inflexible and
unfair results. As the Supreme Court states, "[he inflexible approach adopted by
the Court of Appeals in this case is the kind of reasoning that the Rule was
designed to avoid."29 The Supreme Court gives support to this argument by taking
the facts involved in the present case and applying to them the test enumerated
in the new rule. Not only does the rule work effectively in its weighing of all
interests, but it adequately protects the interests of the absent person.30
The Court's opinion in Provident states firmly that in a diversity action any
dismissal for failure to join is a federal question and that the approach adopted in
new Rule 19 is the means of determining the necessity of that dismissal. But just
how great an effect will this decision have on the existing law? Quite logically,
the application of either the "interest" approach or the "practical balancing"
approach would produce the same results in many instances. For example,
without reference to any prescribed balancing test, courts prior to the adoption
of the new rule reached results quite similar to the one reached in the Provident
case. Courts have determined, without the benefit of new Rule 19, that the absence
of a motor vehicle insured did not require dismissal in a declaratory judgment
action brought to determine the existence of the owner's permission.31 The
26. Id. at 120. The court further points out that no court has ever held that
indispensability is a substantive right. The only judicial statement of this is found
in Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n. 7 (1964), where Aldridge, J. sets forth
"the view that what are indispensable parties is a matter of substance, not of
procedure." However, "[t]aken in context, Judge Aldrich's statement refers simply
to the view that a decision whether to dismiss must be made pragmatically, in the
context of the 'substance' of each case, rather than by procedural formula." Provi-
dent Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson supra note 25, at 120 n. 16.
27. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129, 139 (1855).
28. Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 124-
25 (1968).
29. Id. at 107.
30. Id. at 107-116.
31. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Simms, 231 F. Supp. 787, 792 (D. Md.
1964); Northwest Cas. Co. v. Kirkman, 119 F. Supp. 828 (M.D. N.C. 1954); Glen
Falls Indem. Co. v. Frederickson, 8 F.R.D. 55 (D.C. Neb. 1947); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.
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opinion itself gives some indication that the new rule will not amount to a radical
and immediate departure in result from past authority on joinder, by justifying
the new approach of Rule 19 without overruling existing authority. The court
demonstrates, by applying the new test in the Provident case, just how careful
courts should be in protecting the absent person's interest.3 2
The Provident Court stresses that, in any consideration of dismissal, the best
assurance of a proper result is, at the least, a consideration or balancing of the
four interests mentioned in new Rule 19.33 Although courts are at liberty to weigh
other considerations in the balancing process,3 4 Provident makes it clear that any
dismissal which has resulted from the court's failure to weigh the four primary
considerations of the new rule will be grounds for reversal. The Court seems to be
saying that many courts have leaned too much toward dismissals in favor of the
interest of the absent person through the use of a test which is not adequate for
the very reason that it fails to consider other interests. Thus, it should be safe to
say that courts, in following the command of Provident, will allow more suits to
continue than before, especially where these courts have previously failed to con-
sider any interest but that of the absent person.
Courts will now be required to weigh the practical aspects of all the interests
in the suit instead of strictly adhering to rigid classifications of the absent person's
interest. The lawyer seeking dismissal must be prepared to argue the equities of
the situation. On the other hand, the ingenuity of the lawyer faced with possible
dismissal will be tested as new avenues of argument are now open to him. For
example, Justice Harlan's interpretation of the new rule for the Court places
emphasis upon the shaping of the decree to obtain an equitable result and avoid
dismissal. 35 This approach will definitely challenge the lawyer both to find a
formula for such a decree and to convince the court of the propriety of its appli-
cation.
The Provident case also raises the problem of how state law relating to
joinder will affect diversity suits under the Erie Doctrine.36 Does the fact that
dismissal in joinder situations is a determination made within the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, or that courts have indicated that joinder is a question of
v. Maloney, 44 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1942). But see Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1964).
32. Provident Tradesmens Bank &e Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116-
125 (1968).
33. Id. at 109-116.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, Advisory Committee Notes (1966).
35. Provident Tradesmens Bank 8- Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 115
(1968); FED. R. Civ. P. 19, Advisory Committee Notes (1966).
36. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937), holding that federal courts in
diversity suits should follow state decisions on matters of substantive law; Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), expounding the outcome-determinative
test which states that a conflict of state law and federal practice resulting in a
different outcome in the suit will be resolved in favor of the state law; Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965), stating that the Erie Doctrine was not intended
to nullify federal procedural rules in federal "housekeeping" matters.
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federal law,3 7 bar consideration of state substantive law on joinder? Although the
Court in Provident stated that the question of joinder is one of federal law, it did
find that "state law questions may arise in determining what interest the outsider
actually has."3 8 Bennie v. Pastor,3 9 decided shortly after Provident, contends that
the state law on joinder should be an important factor in the courts' weighing
process, especially where there is a definite conflict between two or more of the
four interests found in the rule. Following this rationale, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, in a diversity action involving New Mexico law which does
not require the presence of an agent in court to determine the validity of a
release, upheld the finding of the New Mexico district court that the absence of
a daughter who drove her mother's car and who gave a release to plaintiff
following an accident did not compel dismissal.4 0
Finally, the Provident decision should have but minor impact upon Missouri
joinder determinations.41 Although there are ample instances where the state
courts in Missouri have stated that a suit may not proceed in the absence of certain
persons, 42 they have not found it necessary to draw a clear distinction between
those parties who are accessable and must be joined, and those who are inaccessable
and compel dismissal.43 This situation is manifested in several ways. The Missouri
37. See Jett v. Zink, 362 F.2d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
987 (1966); Dunbar v. Robertson, 198 F.2d 316, 319 (10th Cir. 1952); Kroese v.
General Steel Casting Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 761 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 983 (1950). All of these cases agree that the question of joinder is one for
federal courts. However, all of them qualify this by stating that state substantive
law is applicable to a determination of the absent person's rights and interests.
This law should be distinguished from the existing state law on joinder (i.e., sub-
stantive law on what parties are indispensable, necessary, or proper).
38. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 102, 125 n. 22
(1968), quoted in Bennie v. Pastor, 393 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1968). Although the
court in Bennie uses this quote from Provident, it is not completely applicable
to the problem considered because the quote seems to refer only to state sub-
stantive law on the absent person's rights or interests. It is not by itself a command
to apply state law on joinder. See also note 33 supra.
39. 393 F.2d 1 (10 Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 45. The court found that the interest of the absent agent's possible
liability from the principal conflicted with the interest of the defendants in ever
having the question litigated and obtaining relief since the daughter-agent had
been missing for over a year. Finding this, the court noted that the outcome
determinative test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), as
modified by Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), was strong grounds to reject
the contention that the agent was indispensable. This rejection plus the command
in Provident to use a pragmatic approach, allowed the court to take state law on
joinder into consideration in deciding not to dismiss.
41. It should be noted that the emphasis in Missouri joinder situations is
upon the interest of the absent party. Section 507.030, RSMo 1959, states in part,
"Persons having a joint interest shall be made parties ...... (Emphasis added).
See also Keeter, Compulsory Joinder of Unwilling Plaintiffs in Civil Actions, 25
Mo. L. R.v. 63 (1960), summarizing Missouri law on joinder.
42. E.g., Peters v. McDonough, 327 Mo. 487, 493, 37 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1931),joint interest in indebtedness; Wittels v. Dubinsky, 343 S.W.2d 644, 646 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1961), partners.
43. The answer to this would seem to lie in the fact that there are no
diversity requirements in Missouri, and therefore the instances of deciding dismissal
where joinder is impossible is greatly reduced. Theoretically, dismissal where
1969]
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rule on compulsory joinder, unlike the old federal rule, mentions neither the
dismissal problem nor indispensable parties, but addresses itself solely to the
criteria for compulsory joinder.44 The Missouri Supreme Court thus far has failed
to distinguish between the terms "necessary" and "indispensable" when a "com-
pulsory" party is inaccessable because it has apparntly never been squarely faced
with the problem.4 5 Rather, their decisions have dealt with the problem of when
an accessable party must be joined.
The Supreme Court in Provident said explicitly that the intentions of new
Rule 19 were not to be restricted by judicial interpretation. Although this decision
will not result in a complete reversal of existing precedent, its effect will be pro-
found. It allows flexibility where flexibility is needed-i.e., in those cases where
adherence to the old approach demonstrably resulted in unfair results. At the same
time, the court points out that this new approach will not impair the consistency
with which courts are able to distinguish between dismissal and non-dismissal situa-
tions. This impact of the new rule's application will be felt most in the significant
challenge presented to the practicing attorney.
MoRRis J. NUNN
GROUP LEGAL SERVICES
United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n.1
The United Mine Workers Union hired legal counsel on a salary basis to
handle claims for its members under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.
The attorney was paid solely by the union and received no compensation from the
individual members represented. A member with a potential claim under the Act
was informed that the union counsel would handle the claim if the member so
desired. While the member could employ his own counsel, in practice the union-
retained attorney handled most of the claims. The Illinois State Bar Association
brought an action to enjoin the union from the unauthorized practice of law.2
joinder is impossible should present a problem since it is quite possible that a
needed party may be inaccessible because of inability to get service. See Comment,
29 CALIF. L. Riv. 731, 733 (1941). But see Note, 48 HAzv. L. RiEv. 995, 996 (1935).
44. § 507.030, RSMo 1959.
45. Miltenburger v. Center W. Enterprises, 251 S.W.2d 385, 389 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1952); Lowdenberg v. De Voigne, 145 Mo. App. 710, 718, 123 S.W. 99, 102
(St. L. Ct. App. 1909); Ellis v. Springfield Southwestern Ry., 130 Mo. App. 221,
225, 109 S.W. 74, 76 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908). But see Casper v. Lee, 362 Mo. 927,
245 S.W.2d 132, 139 (Mo. En Banc 1948), mentioning only the possibility of a
distinction but neither applying nor elaborating what it is.
1. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
2. The Illinois Bar Association based its objection on Canons of Ethics 35 and
47 of the Illinois State Bar Association which are identical to the American Bar As-
sociation Canons of the same numbers.
[Vol. 34
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The injunction was granted and later sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court.3
The United States Supreme Court vacated the injunction on the grounds that
the plan was protected by the first and fourteenth amendment rights of freedom
of speech, assembly, and petition.
The Supreme Court relied upon two of its earlier decisions, which the
Illinois Supreme Court had, in sustaining the injunction, distinguished from the
United Mine Workers situation: NAACP v. Button,4 and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar.5 In the Button case, which arose in Virginia,
the Court had upheld the right of the NAACP to recommend and pay for
counsel for individuals wishing to bring suits involving civil rights, basing the
decision upon the associational freedoms guaranteed in the first and fourteenth
amendments. The Illinois Supreme Court, interpreting the decision, said that an
essential element of Button was that the civil rights litigation could be character-
ized as a form of political expression.0 Justice Black, writing for the majority
in United Mine Workers, rejected the Illinois court's narrow reading of Button,
saying the rights of free speech, assembly, and petition are not confined to any
field of human interests.7
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar8 the Brotherhood
recommended specific attorneys to handle claims for members at prearranged per-
centages of compensation. The Supreme Court had held that the right of the
Brotherhood to recommend to its members a lawyer they could rely on was
constitutionally guaranteed. 9 The Illinois Supreme Court held that because there
had been no direct financial connection between the Brotherhood and the attorney,
the case had no bearing on the United Mine Workers situation. 10 The Supreme
Court rejected the Illinois court's position, saying in both cases the economic
welfare of the attorney depended on the good will of the union and that if the
temptation for the attorney to sacrifice the member's interests to those of the union
was stronger in United Mine Workers, it could only be so to a "virtually imper-
ceptible degree.""
The exact limitation of United Mine Workers is hard to define because the
Supreme Court again has used a "balancing approach,"' 2 weighing the state's
interest in regulating the standards of legal ethics against the individual's first
and fourteenth amendment rights. It does appear, however, that in future cases
3. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.
2d 503 (1966).
4. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
5. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
6. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 123, 219
N.E.2d 503, 509 (1966).
7. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
8. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
9. Id. at 8.
10. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 123, 219
N.E.2d 503, 509 (1966).
11. 389 U.S. 217, 224 (1967).
12. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353
U.S. 252 (1957). These cases are examples of the use of the balancing test.
1969]
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of this nature the state will face a substantial burden in showing the propriety of
its regulation of the legal profession. The court has stated it will start with the
premise that the rights of free speech, assembly, and petition are among the most
precious liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.lS Consequently, the state
must show both that any restriction is reasonably related to the interest sought
to be secured and that the public interest could not have been effectively secured
with less abrasive impact on the personal rights involved.' 4 In other words, the
state will have to demonstrate the specific and substantial dangers which inhere
in such things as baseless litigation, conflicting interest, or group control over
individual suits. This result reflects the fact that the near-absolute control by a
state over the conduct of its bar is now a thing of the past, and in the future state
control will be subject to much closer scrutiny to determine the effect of that
control upon the rights of citizens.15
Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers all deal with organizations
principally formed to protect or promote individual rights. This raises the question
of whether such an organization is essential to the United Mine Workers decision.
In the Missouri case of Automobile Club v. Hoffmeister,6 the organization was
basically a service club. The practice of the Automobile Club was to allow a club
attorney to appear for a member who had received a traffic ticket. The attorney,
at the member's request, either pleaded guilty and paid the fine or pleaded not
guilty and asked for a continuance to allow the member to retain his own attorney.
The club attorney would not defend the member. In a declaratory judgment
suit brought by the Automobile Club, the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that this
was unauthorized practice of law by the Club.17 Clearly the result of Hoffmeister
would be changed if the scope of United Mine Workers is broad enough to include
service-oriented groups. It would seem that no danger of conflicting interests is
present when the attorney is entering such a limited appearance. Baseless litigation
does not seem to be an issue because the Club attorney is simply entering a plea
to an existing controversy. Moreover, there is no detriment to the attorney-client
relationship because the attorney is acting upon the instructions of the individual
member. In short, there does not seem to exist a state interest that would overcome
the individual right to associate to obtain legal services. Moreover, because Justice
Black's opinion in United Mine Workers indicates that the pivotal question is
whether the state has unnecessarily infringed upon personal rights, the type of
organization involved would seem to be of little consequence.lS The state will now
have to show other justification to stop this type of practice, and the mere
existence of a rule against it will not be sufficient. It would appear therefore,
that Automobile Club v. Hoffmeister is no longer law in Missouri in light of the
United Mine Workers decision.
13. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
14. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); and In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
16. 338 S.W.2d 348 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
17. The court did not consider associational freedoms in deciding the case.
18. See Comment, 79 H~Aiv. L. R.v. 416 (1965).
[Vol. 34
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The State Bar of California formed a committee in 1958 to study the existence
of group legal service arrangements and determine how they should be handled
by the local bar association.' 9 The committee stated in its 1964 progress report
that it believed the use of legal services by groups was caused to a significant degree
by the inability of clients to find attorneys who are fully qualified to handle
their particular type of legal problem. 20 The committee noted that the trend
toward group legal services could be somewhat abated if the bar were to improve
substantially its own referral services.2 1 The progress report also presented some
guidelines for allowing group legal services within the scope of proper professional
conduct.2 2 In August of 1968, the committee proposed substantial changes in the
California Rules of Professional Conduct. The proposed rule changes start with
the premise that it is not improper for an attorney to give legal services to indi-
vidual members of a group when certain safeguards are present. These safeguards
are contained in the committee's Proposed Rule 20.23 While most of the com-
mittee's recommendations offer proper and necessary safeguards for the protection
of both the potential client and the attorney, they also present several problems.
Subsection 2-A of Proposed Rule 20, restricting the legal services offered by
the group attorney to matters related to the "common principal purposes" for
which the group was organized, is a limitation that is both hard to define and
justify in light of Trainmen and United Mine Workers. Numerous groups such
as labor unions, minority organizations, and teachers associations have many and
varied functions and interests. Assume that the NAACP had a group attorney
handle problems for a local chapter's membership in California. If a member
wanted to have the group attorney handle an unemployment compensation claim
arising out of discharge from employment it would seem that this is not a "common
principal purpose" of the NAACP and would be objectionable. If, however, one
of the reasons for the action was an allegation that the member was discriminated
against because of his color, it would seem that the group attorney could handle
the case. In this situation the test the committee offers is an impractical guideline,
leaving both the group member and the attorney uncertain as to their rights
and responsibilities. Moreover, the language of Trainmen and United Mine Work-
ers does not support confining the attorney's services to such limited areas. In
Trainmen the court said:
19. 33 CAL. BAR J. 213 (1958).
20. Committee Report on Group Legal Services, 39 CAL. BAR J. 639, 702
(1964).
21. Ibid. See also Christensen, Lawyer Referral Service: An Alternative to
Lay Group Legal Services, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 341 (1965).
22. Committee Report on Group Legal Services, 39 CAL. BAR J. 639, 723 (1964).
23. 43 CAL. BAR J. 474 (1968). Rule 20:
The participation of a member of the State Bar in a plan for the provision
of legal services to the individual members of a group or organization, as
herein defined, either on a salary basis or otherwise, is not a violation of
these Rules of Professional Conduct if the member's participation
conforms to the said plan and if the terms of such plan (1) are contained
in a writing duly authenticated by an authorized representative of the
group or organization and filed with the State Bar and set forth the nature
and extent of the legal services to be made available under such plan,
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And the right of workers personally or through a special department of
their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistance-and,
most importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on-is an
inseparable part of this constitutionally guaranteed right to assist and
advise each other.24
The Court said that individuals have a right to associate for legal assistance
and that it would not limit that right to needs in limited areas of the law or to
actions based on particular wrongs.25 The California restriction therefore seems
to go directly against Trainmen and United Mine Workers and must be open to
great doubt.
Another major question arises from the California Bar's proposed definition
of a group. The rules say that the group must be formed principally for common
purposes other than the rendering of legal service and that the furnishing of legal
services must be merely incidental to the accomplishment of this common purpose.
The rule does not recognize the right of people to join together solely for the
purpose of obtaining group legal services. The problem with this rule is that
joining or belonging to a group formed for other common purposes becomes a
(2) contain adequate provisions which will (a) limit such legal services
to matters related to the common principal purposes for which group or
organization was formed and provide personal and adequate legal repre-
sentation for such matters, (b) recognize the right of each member of the
group to obtain legal services at his own expense other than the legal
services provided under the plan, (c) prevent (i) the representation by
such member of the State Bar of conflicting interests, except such plan shall
not preclude in individual cases such representation with full knowledge
and consent of all parties concerned, (ii) such group or organization or
its agents from interfering with, controlling, or directing the performance
of the duty of such member of the State Bar to his client, (iii) the
solicitation of professional employment in violation of the provisions of
rules 2 and 3 hereof, (iv) such group or organization from deriving or
being entitled to derive a profit from the compensation arising out of or
incidental to the professional services of the member of the State Bar and
(v) unlicensed persons from practicing law thereunder, and (d) limit the
advertising or publicizing of the plan (i) in the solicitation of membership
in the group or organization to a dignified announcement of the availa-
bility of the legal service without reference to the member or members
the State Bar participating therein and (ii) in communications to mem-
bers of the group or organization concerning the plan, to a dignified
statement of the name, address and qualifications of the member or
members of the State Bar participating therein and (3) are found to com-
ply with the provisions of this rule by the Board of Governors or any
committee authorized by it to make a final determination on its behalf.
Such determination may be reviewed pursuant to Rule 59 (b), California
Rules of Court. As used in this rule, a group or organization, incorporated
or otherwise, shall be limited to a combination of persons formed princi-
pally for common purposes other than the rendering of legal services
and wherein the furnishing of legal services is merely incidental to the
accomplishment of such purposes.
43 CAL. BAR J. 474 (1968).
24. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6
(1964). [hereinafter cited as Trainmen]
25. Trainmen. See also United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 222 (1967); also discussed in, Comment, 79 HAv. L. Rv. 416 (1965).
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condition precedent to obtaining group legal services. The constitutionality of
this requirement seems to be doubtful because in both Trainmen and United
Mine Workers the Court has spoken of the right to associate to obtain legal
services as constitutionally guaranteed. There was no mention that a condition of
exercising this right is the joining of a group that has other functions. United Mine
Workers says that the state now has to show that the rules are made to stop
actual harm to the client or to the public in general. The fact that the group has
no other purpose than providing legal services to its members would not seem
to be a harm to the public.
While the constitutionality of the California rules is subject to doubt, at least
that state has taken some action. Missouri, on the other hand, has chosen to ignore
the problem. We now know that Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4.35 is invalid,26
yet no change has been made. The consequences of ignoring the problem were
well stated by Professor Edwin Tucker after the Trainmen case:
Brotherhood demands that the Canons be reconsidered. If the legal pro-
fession and the individual states fail to do so, they very well may forfeit
to the federal government the power to regulate the practice of law. The
Supreme Court has called upon the bar to make changes in its group rules.
Not everything agreed upon by the profession and the states will be found
to be constitutionally acceptable. Only those Canons which serve the in-
terest of society will be sustained by the Court. In those instances where a
particular Canon comes into conflict with currently sought-after objec-
tives, the Canon will have to yield. 27
United Mine Workers is one more step in the forfeiture of state power to regulate
the practice of law. The decision should serve as warning to the bar that it must
update its Canons of Ethics if the trend is to be stopped.28
GERRY D. OSTRLAND
26. Rule 4.35 states:
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an
association, dub or trade organization, to render legal services in any
matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this em-
ployment should not include the rendering of legal services to the members
of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs.
This rule is no longer valid because of the express holding of United Mine Workers
and must be changed to allow the rendering of individual services by the attorney.
27. Tucker, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, A Call to Realism
in Legal Ethics, 14 J. PUB. L. 3, 21 (1965).
28. See generally The Availability of Counsel and Group Legal Services: A
Symposium, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 279 (1965); A Revolution in Law Practice?
(Symposium), 15 Crv.-MAR. L. R.v. 203 (1966); Zimroth, Group Legal Services
and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967); and Comment, 19 FLA. L. Rxv.
360 (1966). For additional material see an extensive bibliography at 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 456 (1965).
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-ACCEPTANCE AFTER INSPECTION
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith'
Mr. Smith, wanting to buy a new automobile, signed the purchase order form
which was given to him by Zabriskie Chevrolet, a local dealer. When he signed
the order, Smith made a down payment of $124, and one week later he tendered a
check for the balance of the purchase price. On the day following the tender of
the check, delivery was made to Mrs. Smith who had called for the car at the
dealer's showroom. While driving home, which was about two and one-half miles
away, the car stalled repeatedly and could not be driven in the "drive" gear
at all. After being called by his wife, Smith drove the car the rest of the way
home in "low-low" gear at the car's then maximum speed of five to ten miles per
hour. Smith immediately stopped payment on the check and called the dealer
to tell him that the car was a "lemon" and that Smith considered the sale
cancelled. The next day the dealer towed the car to his repair shop where a
mechanic found the trouble to be a defective transmission. The dealer replaced
the transmission with one from another car on the showroom floor, but Smith
refused to accept delivery of the car with the transplanted transmission. Nego-
tiations for another car failed when the dealer insisted that a new deal could be
made only by giving Smith credit for the previously ordered car. Smith refused
this condition because he considered the previous transaction cancelled. The
dealer then brought suit to recover on the purchase order and the check signed
by Smith. Smith counterclaimed for return of the down payment deposit and for
incidental damages. Refusing to apply the remedies found in the standard form
contract, 2 the court decided the case under the Uniform Commercial Code as
adopted in New Jersey.S After finding that he had never accepted delivery of the
automobile, the court awarded Smith recovery.
Because the Code by its very nature encompasses a typical commercial trans-
action in toto, it becomes impossible to concentrate upon a particular section of
the Code without giving due consideration to those other sections which are in-
separably related. This means that in a case like Zabriskie the court must resolve
the issue of acceptance before considering the various remedies available under
the Code.4 A finding of acceptance is the focal point in a Code analysis of a sales
transaction because if the buyer has accepted the goods, he becomes liable for
the purchase price and any damages for non-conformities must be recovered
1. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
2. To avoid the standard form warranty disclaimer the court relied upon
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
3. The UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE became effective in New Jersey on
January 1, 1963, N.J. STAT. AnN. §§ 12A: 1-101 to 12A: 10-106 (1962). Hereinafter
references shall be to the "Code" and section numbers shall be as they appear in
the 1962 Official Text of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE as published by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws.
4. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super 441, 451, 240 A.2d 195,
200 (1968); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711, comment 1.
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under a warranty theory. 5 But if the buyer has not accepted, and is justified in so
acting,6 he may recover so much of the purchase price as he has paid and cancel the
transaction.7
Heretofore the majority of the cases litigated under the Code which have
dealt with the issue of. inspection prior to acceptance have focused upon the ques-
tion of what constitutes the upper limit upon a reasonable opportunity to inspect.8
These cases have considered how long a buyer may retain the goods without being
deemed to have accepted them.9 In contrast, the Zabriskie court looked to the
minimal temporal limitations which may be placed upon inspection opportunities;
that is, when the period of time allotted for inspection becomes so short as to be
unreasonable under the Code.
To resolve the acceptance issue, the Zabriskie court first considered Code sec-
tion 2-606(l)(a), which allows the buyer a "reasonable opportunity" to inspect the
goods for non-conformity before acceptance. 10 The reasonable inspection period
may vary with the nature of the goods involved; therefore, if the goods are such
that a latent non-conformity could not be discovered upon a cursory examination,
then a longer period with time for actual testing and use may be permitted."
Under section 2-606(l)(c) any act of the buyer which is inconsistent with the
seller's ownership may amount to an acceptance at the election of the seller. Courts
have frequently found that the buyer's use of the goods after the lapse of a reason-
able inspection opportunity is inconsistent with the seller's ownership.' 2 Hence, in-
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-607 (1), 2-714.
6. In this context, goods "not accepted" includes those goods for which ac-
ceptance has been justifiably revoked as well as those goods rightfully rejected.
UNIFORM COTMERCIAL CODE § 2-711 (1).
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711 (1).
8. E.g., Woods v. Van Wallis Trailer Sales Co., 77 N.M. 121, 419 P.2d 964
(1966); General Foods Corp. v. Bittinger Co., 31 Pa. D.&C.2d 282 (C.P., York Cty,
1963); Cohen Salvage Corp. v. Eastern Electric Sales Co., 34 Pa. D.&C.2d 705 (C.P.
No. 1, Phila. Cty., 1964).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to
the seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or
retain them in spite of their non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section
2-602), but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such
act is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if
ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that en-
tire unit.
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606 (1)(b).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606.
11. Marks v. Lehigh Brickface, Inc., 19 Pa. D.&C.2d 666 (C.P., Dauphin Cty.,
1959). This was the Pre-Code position. 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 475 (Rev. Ed. 1948);
Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1173 (1955). For the Code definition of reasonable time see
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1,204.
12. General Foods Corp. v. Bittinger Co., 31 Pa. D.&C.2d 282 (C.P., York
Cty., 1963); Woods v. Van Wallis Trailer Sales Co., 77 N.M. 121, 419 P.2d 964
(1966); Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966); Park
County Implement Co. v. Craig, 397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964).
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spection usage may easily blur into acceptance usage. But the Zabriskie court held
that the "first few miles of driving" after delivery was not a use inconsistent with
the seller's ownership.' 3 This initial driving period is the "first reasonable oppor-
tunity .. . to see if it conforms to what it was represented to be and whether he
[the buyer] is getting what he bargained for."' 4 The fact that this initial period
is the first reasonable opportunity for inspection coupled with the court's state-
ment that "it is clear that a buyer does not accept goods until he has had a
'reasonable opportunity to inspect' "15 seems to dearly indicate that a buyer cannot
be denied a reasonable time for inspection before acceptance.
The weight of this language bears most heavily upon the typical acceptance
acknowledgement clause often found in an unnegotiated standard form contract
which is signed by the buyer upon delivery.'0 Frequently, a standard clause
acknowledges the receipt of the goods in satisfactory condition and says that the
buyer has examined the goods and accepts them. In a recent Pennsylvania case,
Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co.,' the buyer had just purchased
a new automobile, and while driving from the dealer's showroom, he discovered
smoke and loud noises coming from the engine. Confronted with a standard form
acceptance acknowledgement, the court bound the buyer, saying:
There is no doubt that the plaintiff accepted this new automobile. He
executed the conditional sales contract which provided that he ac-
knowledged acceptance of the Mercury in good order, and he drove it
from the showroom to his home.'8
The Zabriskie opinion implies that the limitation which an acceptance acknowledge-
ment clause places on the buyer's opportunity to inspect before acceptance is
manifestly unreasonable. Enforcement of the acceptance clause would deny to a
buyer his "first reasonable opportunity" for inspection.19 Protecting the consumer
in the face of such a written acceptance acknowledgement finds support in the
broad Code standard of good faith. The Code preserves wide latitude in freedom
of contract by permitting Code provisions to be varied by agreement between the
13. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 453, 240 A.2d 195,
202 (1968).
14. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
15. Id. at 452, 240 A.2d at 201; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-513, comment
1; 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO ThE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1.40 (1964).
16. Note that Zabriskie does not on its facts preclude the effectiveness of a
negotiated waiver or reduction of inspection time in a commercial sale. E.g., UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-512.
17. 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966).
18. Id. at 123, 224 A.2d at 784.
19. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. at 452-453, 240 A.2d at
202. "Inspection" is to be distinguished from "examination." Inspection has to do
with the buyer's checkup on whether the seller's performance is in accordance
with the contract previously made. Examination of the goods or of a sample or
model of them occurs at the time of contracting and may affect the warranties
involved in the contract. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-513, comment 9.
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parties. At the same time, however, the Code demands adherence to the standards
of "good faith" and "reasonableness." 20
The Zabriskie decision also illustrates another aspect of Code acceptance
which may easily become a pitfall for the buyer. Section 2-606(l)(c) says that a
buyer's exercise of dominion over the goods which is consistent with the seller's
ownership and is ratified by the seller results in acceptance by the buyer. When
considered with section 2-602(2)(a) which provides that the buyer's exercise of
ownership after rejection is wrongful as against the seller, it is clear that a buyer
may be held to have accepted goods even after engaging in Zonduct that would
seemingly cause rejection.21 Obviously, this result may not be what the buyer de-
sires. The case of Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson22 exemplifies the buyer's
predicament. Wilkinson bought a used truck which the seller had assured was
in good mechanical repair and used little or no oil. On the day Wilkinson first
drove the truck after taking delivery, the two-speed mechanism malfunctioned and
the truck used two quarts of oil on an eighty-five mile trip. Wilkinson complained
to the seller who denied that there was anything wrong with the truck. Under
Zabriskie these facts would give rise to a right of rejection. But Wilkinson had the
two-speed mechanism repaired at his own expense and two months later the
engine exploded. Wilkinson was held liable for the purchase price.23 Because he
was intimidated by a recalcitrant seller, Wilkinson nullified his own rejection by
his subsequent acts of dominion.
The Zabriskie facts illustrate the proper procedure for a buyer to follow to
avoid an unwanted acceptance. To insure that rejection will remain effective and
not become an acceptance, the seller should be reasonably notified of the rejection,
and the buyer should thereafter take care not to exercise dominion over the goods
which may be inconsistent with the seller's interest.24 It is advisable to follow the
procedure specified in the Code and store the goods for the seller's account, de-
manding return of the purchase price.2 5 If adequate grounds for rejection exist,
20. UNIFORM¢ COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102 (3) and comment 2, 2-602, com-
ment 1.
21. Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964);
Grucella v. General Motors Corp., 10 Pa. D&gC.2d 65 (C.P. No. 7 of Phila. Cty.,
1956); Galati v. Potamkin Chevrolet Co., Inc., 198 Pa. Super. 533, 181 A.2d 900
(1962).
22. 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964).
23. Id. at 412, 382 S.W.2d at 192.
24. The buyer should always be aware of the caveat embodied in the Code
concept of cure in § 2-508. When the tender of delivery is rejected because of
non-conformity and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may
cure the defect within the contract time. Also, where the buyer rejects a non-
conforming tender which the seller has reasonable grounds to believe would be
acceptable, the seller may, upon seasonable notification to the buyer substitute a
conforming delivery within a reasonable time beyond the contract time. R.
DUESENBERG & L. KING, SATEs BULK TRANsFERs UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 14.02 (1) (1968).
25. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-604, 2-711, 2-715. Note, however, that if
the goods are of a perishable nature making storage costly to the seller, the buyer
may be under a duty to sell the goods for the seller's account. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-603.
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the buyer should resist any attempt by the seller to encourage the buyer to make
the repairs himself.
Zabriskie extends a degree of protection to the consumer faced with the pur-
chase of goods, whose complex nature makes an on-the-spot inspection impossible.
Deriving a reasonable opportunity to inspect from the broader, more sweeping
standards of good faith and reasonableness, demonstrates the increasing tendency
of the courts in consumer transactions to consider matters that heretofore were
technically extraneous to the contract. Under Zabriskie the consumer who pos-
sesses few commercial skills can feel a little safer when he enters the marketplace
in search of the intricate products so much a part of today's economy.
STEPHEN K. TAYLOR
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
United States v. Donruss Co.1
Sections 531 and 5322 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 impose a penalty
tax on a corporation whenever the corporation permits its earnings and profits
to accumulate for the purpose of avoiding income tax to its shareholders. In the
absence of this accumulated earnings tax, corporations could withhold paying divi-
dends until the tax conditions of its shareholders favored disbursement. Because
of the difficulty of proving this proscribed purpose, Congress attempted to relate
this subjective issue of tax avoidance purpose to a much more objective one. For
this reason, a presumption of tax avoidance purpose is included in the statute, and
automatically arises when a corporation is shown to have accumulated earnings
and profits in excess of the reasonable needs of the business.3 The presumption can
1. 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 531. Imposition of Accumulated Earnings Tax-
In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby im-
posed for each taxable year on the accumulated taxable income . . . . an
accumulated earnings tax ....
§ 532. Corporations subject to Accumulated Earnings Tax-
(a) General Rule-The accumulated earnings tax imposed by Section
531 shall apply to every corporation . . . formed or availed of for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders ....
by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided
or distributed.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533. Evidence of Purpose to Avoid Income
Tax-
(a) Unreasonable Accumulation Determinative of Purpose-For pur-
poses of section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect
to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evi-
dence shall prove to the contrary.
[Vol. 34
49
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
RECENT CASES
be rebutted if the corporation can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the accumulation is not for the improper purpose.4
The typical accumulated earnings case theoretically consists of two phases.
The first phase is concerned with whether the accumulations were for the reason-
able needs of the business. If the taxpayer fails to show that his accumulations
are reasonable, then the presumption that the accumulations are to avoid income
taxes to the shareholders arises. This initiates the second phase-the attempt by
the taxpayer to rebut the presumption of tax avoidance purpose. In United
States v. Donruss, the Supreme Court ruled on the degree of tax avoidance which
must be present to uphold the imposition of accumulated earnings tax.
The taxpayer in Donruss was a corporation, whose stock had been owned by
one man since 1954. Between 1955 and 1961, the corporation operated profitably
and its undistributed earnings increased from 1 to 1.6 million dollars, no divi-
dends having been declared during that period. The Commissioner, under sections
531-532, assessed and collected from the company accumulated earnings taxes for
the years 1960-61, contending that the accumulation was for the purpose of mini-
mizing income taxes for its sole stockholder. Thereafter, taxpayer brought a refund
suit in federal district court claiming that the purpose of its accumulation was to
meet its reasonably anticipated business needs for the two years in question.5 At
the conclusion of the trial, the court refused to instruct, as requested by the Com-
missioner, that it was not necessary that the accumulations be for the sole purpose
of minimizing the taxes of its shareholder-so long as it was one of the purposes
for the accumulation, the jury must find for the Government. Instead, the court
instructed the jury to find for the government if the accumulation was for the
purpose of tax avoidance. The jury, in response to interrogatories, found that
the taxpayer had accumulated earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness, but that it had not retained its earnings for the purpose of avoiding the
income taxes on its sole stockholder. Therefore, the court ruled that the tax
should not have been assessed.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was concerned that the jury below
may have been led to believe that the assessment was proper only if tax avoidance
was the sole purpose for the accumulation. They reversed and remanded holding
that it was sufficient if the Government convinced the jury that avoidance of tax
was the dominant reason for the accumulation.6 The Supreme Court, because of a
conflict among the circuits, granted certiorari7 on the question of degree of pur-
pose necessary for the application of the tax, and reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that tax avoidance did not have to
be the dominant, controlling, or impelling motive for the accumulation, but need
only be "one of the purposes."
The dispute that the Court had to resolve dealt with the extent of tax avoid-
ance purpose necessary to support the tax. Taxpayer contended that it could
4. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 533.
5. 15 A.F.T.R.2d 896 (1965).
6. 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967).
7. 390 U.S. 1023 (1968).
1969]
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rebut the presumption by showing that tax avoidance was not the "dominant,
controlling, or impelling" purpose for the accumulation. The Government con-
tended that the taxpayer could not rebut the presumption unless he could show
that tax avoidance was not "one of the purposes."
The various circuits had interpreted "purpose" differently, and when Donruss
was argued, there were at least four lines of reasoning. The First 8 and Sixth9
Circuits were of the view that the purpose to avoid tax had to be "dominant, con-
troling, or impelling." At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Seventh Circuit' 0
held that the failure of the taxpayer to show a complete absence of purpose to
avoid tax was sufficient to support the tax. Between these extremes, the Second"
and Fifthl2 Circuits ruled that it was sufficient to impose the tax if tax avoidance
was "one of the purposes," and the Eighth13 and Tenth14 Circuits held that tax
avoidance must be a "determining factor" for the accumulation.
The parties in Donruss first turned to the language of the Code in support of
their positions.15 The taxpayer argued that the Code does not say "a" purpose, but
rather "the" purpose, and thus the issue in an accumulated earnings case should
not be what was an incidental motive for the accumulation, but rather, what was
the primary purpose for the accumulation. The Government contended that if
Congress had intended purpose to be modified by primary or dominant, they
would have used these terms in the statute as they had in other sections of the
Code. 16 In response to this argument, the taxpayer cited cases in which the Court
had figuratively written the word dominant into other parts of the Code."7 Other
arguments concerning the wording of the statute centered around the related sec-
tions of the Revenue Act of 1938, and its use of the words "the" and "a." 18 The
Court found that these semantic arguments by both parties were inconclusive.
The Supreme Court based its decision on the legislative history of sections
531-537, which revealed that Congress recognized very early that the corporation
could be used as a means of avoiding taxes on its shareholders. As early as 1921,
Congress enacted provisions which were designed to prevent such a result, and
8. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
9. Donruss represents the view of the Sixth Circuit. This position was fol-
lowed in Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968).
10. Pelton Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153, 174, af'd 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
11. Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
12. Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962).
13. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
14. World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949).
15. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 532.
16. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 269(a), 357(b)(1).
17. Taxpayer cited in support of his argument Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278 (1960), a case involving the taxation of gifts. The court stated,
"We find those cases inapposite. They deal with areas of the Code whose language,
purpose and legislative history are entirely different from that of the accumulated
earnings tax." 393 U.S. 297, 308-309 (1969).
18. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289 § 102(a) and (b), 52 Stat. 483.
[Vol. 34
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from that time to the present there have been ten such acts.19 A prerequisite under
all of them has been the requirement that the corporation be availed of for
the purpose of shielding its shareholders from the income tax. Congress realized
that a penalty statute based on state of mind might be difficult to enforce without
the aid of a presumption; in the 1921 Act such a presumption was created. 20
With the idea that reasonable accumulations were often necessary for business
purposes, in 1938, Congress tied reasonable accumulations and the purpose to
avoid shareholder taxes together by requiring that "the corporation by a . . .
preponderance of the evidence . . . prove the absence of any purpose to avoid
surtaxes on its shareholders after it has been determined that the earnings and
profits have been unreasonably accumulated." 21 By the use of this presumption,
Congress tried to alleviate the government's difficulty in proving the taxpayer's
state of mind. The 1954 Code did not change the presumption, but only empha-
sized reasonable needs of the business as the proper purpose for corporate
accumulations. The Court interpreted this history as showing that Congress wanted
to rely upon the comparatively objective criterion of unreasonable accumulation
in light of business needs as the proper criterion for the imposition of the tax.
In Donruss the taxpayer's proposed test of not imposing the tax unless the purpose
to avoid tax was the dominant one, if accepted, said the Court, would "well nigh
destroy the presumption." Because of this possibility, the Court ruled that the
government's interpretation of "one of the purposes" to be more consistent with
the intent of Congress, and thus was the proper interpretation.
Under the 1939 Code, if the taxpayer failed to show that his accumulations
were reasonable, 22 then the presumption of tax avoidance purpose automatically
came into existence. But the taxpayer still had a last chance to win the law suit if
he could rebut the presumption by a clear23 preponderance of the evidence.2 4
Similarly, if the taxpayer won on the reasonableness issue, the Government could
still win the case if it could show that "purpose" was actually present.25 Thus, both
the Government and taxpayer had a "last chance" to win on the purpose issue
even if they lost the reasonableness issue.
19. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 277; Revenue Act of 1924,
ch. 234, § 220, 43 Stat. 220; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 220, 44 Stat. 9; Revenue
Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 104, 47 Stat. 195; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 104, 47
Stat. 169; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 102, 48 Stat. 702; Revenue Act of 1936,
ch. 690, § 102, 49 Stat. 1648; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102, 52 Stat. 483;
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 102; INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-537.
20. "The fact . . . that the gains and profits are permitted to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be prima facie evidence of
purpose to avoid the surtax." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 277.
21. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 102(c).
22. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 534, provides that in certain situations the
taxpayer can shift his burden of proof on the reasonableness issue to the Com-
missioner. This Code provision, however, does not shift the burden on the ulti-
mate issue of purpose.
23. One of the changes in the 1954 Code was the elimination of the word
"clear."
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 102(c). See, e.g., Guy Blass, 9 T.C. 15 (1947).
25. For a case showing this possibility, see United States v. R.C. Tway Coal
Sales Co., 75 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935).
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One of the changes made in the 1954 Code was the adoption of the accumu-
lated earnings credit,2 0 which is generally equal to the amount retained for the
reasonable needs of the business.27 Thus, the reasonable needs issue is now raised
in two distinct contexts: the absence of reasonable needs is used by the Government
to trigger the presumption of tax avoidance, while the presence of reasonable
needs is used by the taxpayer to establish the credit which offsets the taxable
accumulation. The effect of the credit is to all but eliminate the Government's
last chance to win, which existed under the 1939 Code, for if the taxpayer can
show that his accumulations are reasonable, he gets a credit against the accumu-
lation. Thus, once the taxpayer has established the reasonable needs for the
accumulation, he does not care that the government may show that the funds were
also accumulated to avoid shareholder taxes because the credit will defeat the
tax. Therefore, the taxpayer has two chances to win while the Government only
has one.
By making the tax applicable when tax avoidance was only "one of the pur-
poses" for the accumulation, Donruss, in effect, removes the taxpayer's last chance
to win. This is because it will be relatively easy for the Government to show that
tax avoidance was a purpose. The sum total of Donruss, therefore, is to equalize
both parties' chances of winning, by making the only real issue in an accumulated
earnings case the reasonable needs of the business. This is especially true in a jury
trial, where the jury would be instructed that upon finding the accumulation un-
reasonable they are to find for the Government if the taxpayer acted with a purpose
to avoid taxes. If such an instruction were given, the jury would be very likely to
find for the Government whenever it could be shown that the shareholders knew
that the corporate accumulation would result in individual tax savings. Once the
taxpayer is shown to have possessed this knowledge, it will be extremely difficult
to show that tax avoidance did not play some part, since, as the dissent pointed
out, "a man is presumed to intend the known consequences of his act." Any in-
struction on purpose which uses the Court-adopted test appears to be overly
favorable to the government on this issue. The result is that a taxpayer must pre-
vail on the reasonableness issue, or stand little chance of winning.
Although Congress may have intended to rely more heavily on reasonable
needs as the criterion for the imposition of the tax, they by no means intended
to eliminate purpose to avoid tax as the ultimate issue. Nor did they mean to
change the tax to apply in all cases where a corporation had accumulated funds
beyond the reasonable needs of the business. Although the answer to the question
of reasonableness "may well be the single most important consideration in con-
cluding whether taxpayer acted with the proper purpose in mind, the ultimate
issue is still tax avoidance purpose."28 The wording of section 533 clearly indi-
26. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 535(c).
27. Under the 1939 Code the penalty was applied to all of the accumulations,
even when only part was unreasonable, provided that the proscribed purpose
was found. See, e.g., World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th
Cir. 1948), aff'g 72 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Okla.).
28. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 490 (1st Cir. 1960).
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cates that the taxpayer is to have a last chance to win the law suit by rebutting the
presumption of purpose, even if his accumulations are shown to be unreasonable.
The effect of Donruss is to deprive him of this chance.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, felt that this last chance should not be written out
of the statute. To avoid such a result, he felt that the best rule would be to impose
the tax if the taxpayer would not have accumulated earnings but for its knowledge
that tax savings would result. Such a test would be consistent with the statutory
purpose of penalizing accumulations designed for tax avoidance, for it would im-
pose the tax only on those corporations whose purpose to avoid tax was "meaning-
ful and motivating." At the same time it would give the taxpayer a clear chance
to escape the tax even though its accumulations had been shown to be unreasonable.
The House report accompanying the revision of the accumulated earnings tax
to Congress in 1954 stated:
Your committee has received numerous complaints that this provision is
prejudicial. . .. has been used in an arbitrary manner, and that it is a
constant threat to expanding business enterprises. Your committee believes
it is necessary to minimize this threat [of the accumulated earnings tax] to
corporations....29
Pursuant to this objective of removing deterrents to business expansion, the re-
strictions on accumulated earnings in the 1954 Code were materially relaxed.30 In
light of the statements of Congress and the Code changes that followed, Justice
Harlan's test seems more in line with the legislative intent than the Government's
test which the majority of the Court adopted.
In practice, the reasonable needs issue has always been the chief battleground
of accumulated earnings tax cases, and most of the cases have been won or lost
on this issue.31 However, practitioners still had the hope that the ability to rebut
the presumption might enable them to prevail, even if they lost on the reasonable-
ness issue. With Donruss, however, the Supreme Court has reduced that dream to
microscopic proportions.
MYo S. ZWIBELMAN
29. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
30. The changes made in the 1954 Code include: the accumulated earnings
credit, see § 535; the establishment of mechanics for a possible burden of proof
shift on the reasonable needs issue, see § 534; the provision that reasonable needs
of the business include the reasonably anticipated needs, see § 537; the provision
that the taxpayer can rebut the statutory presumption by a proponderance of the
evidence, rather than by a clear preponderance, compare INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 533 with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 102(c).
31. D. HERwrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 575 (1966).
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